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Lender Liability Under CERCL Interpreting the
Security Interest Exemption Using Common-Law
Principles of Lender Liability
I.

INTRODUCTION

The bill which became law was hurriedly put together by a
bipartisan leadership group of senators (with some assistance
from their House counterparts), introduced, and passed by the
Senate in lieu of all other pending measures on the subject. It
was then placed before the House, in the form of a Senate
amendment of the earlier House bill. It was considered on
December 3, 1980, in the closing days of the lame duck session
of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed, after
very limited debate, under a suspension of the rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments. Faced with a complicated bill on a take-it-or-leave it basis, the House took it, groan1
ing all the way.
Although this quote could be referring to any number of laws
enacted by Congress, one reasonable conclusion can be inferred
a difficult road lies ahead for the future interpretation and
application of this law. Such is the case with the law referred to
above: The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).2 In an attempt to redress the hazardous waste problems in this country, CERCLA established a "Superfund" which provides the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 3 with financial assistance for hazardous waste
cleanups. This Superfund is only used, however, if someone cannot be found liable for the cleanup costs at the contaminated site.
Section 9607(a) of CERCLA names four classes of persons4

1 Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund') Act of 1980, 8 CoLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1, 1 (1982).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
3 The President delegated his authority to implement CERCLA to the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under Executive Order Number 12,316,
46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981), superseded by Executive Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg.
2,923 (1987). Jeffrey M. Gaba, Lender Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Wastes, 45 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 52, 53 n.11 (1991). See infra note 204 (discussing EPA and Presidential authority under CERCLA).
4 CERCLA defines a person as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
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potentially responsible for cleanup costs at contaminated sites.
These potentially responsible parties (PRP's) include: (1) the current "owner and operator" of a facility;5 (2) the "owner or operator" of a facility when the hazardous wastes were disposed;' (3)
the person or entity that arranged for treatment or disposal of
substances at the facility;,7 and (4) the person or entity that transported the substances to the facility.' CERCLA subjects these
PRP's to strict liability9 which is joint and several.' 0 Thus, once a
person is found liable under CERCLA, the ramifications can be
tremendous." Although CERCLA provides affirmative defenses to

nership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42

U.S.C. § 9601(21).
5

Section 9607(a)(1) holds liable "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facili. ." Id. § 9607(a)(1).
6 Section 9607(a)(2) holds liable "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of. . . ." Id. § 9607(a) (2).
7 Section 9607(a)(3) holds liable:
ty .

any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances ....
I& § 9607(a)(3).
8 Section 9607(a)(4) holds liable "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
" Id.
§
9607(a) (4).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 161, 167 & 167-68 n.11 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. CharlesThomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 833-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affid in part, rev'd in part 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. deied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
10 Joint and several liability allows one PRP to be responsible for the entire cleanup
cost at a contaminated site. Nevertheless, courts have limited this by providing for equitable apportionment of liability among responsible parties. See, eg., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at
171 & n.23; Notheastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 844-55; United States
v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252-57 (S.D. I1. 1984); United States v. ChemDyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See generally Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Rdeases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L REV. 1157 (1982).
11 According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the average cost of
cleaning up a site on the EPA's National Priorities List is $25 million, with the cost at
some sites almost $100 million. Federal Contract Policy 'Revolving Door' Issue Tops Legislative
Agenda, [Special Report] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 13, at S-42 (Jan. 18, 1991).
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12
liability, these defenses only offer narrow margins for success.
The key, therefore, is to avoid CERCLA liability altogether.
Nevertheless, secured creditors,"' such as a commercial bank
holding a mortgage on property contaminated with hazardous
wastes, have found themselves unable to avoid CERCLA liability.
Lender liability under CERCLA has created a conflict between
economic interests and environmental interests, with the controversy centering on the exemption of secured creditors from the

This has increased from the EPA's estimated average cost of $12 million per site in the

early 1980's. Lender Liability Under Superfund: The Increasing Risks of Exposure, 12 Issues in
Bank Regulation (Bank Administrative Institute) No. 1, at 3 (Summer 1988).
12 CERCLA allows PRP's to escape liability if a person can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the hazardous substance release (or threat of release and
damages resulting therefrom) was caused solely by one of the following- (1) an act of
God; (2) an act of war;, or (3) an act or omission of a third party with whom the defendant had no contractual relationship existing, directly or indirectly. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
This last defense, "the third party defense," requires the defendant to establish that "(a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned . . . and (b)
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
Id.
d.." §
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions ..
9607(b) (3).

In 1986, Congress adopted the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782. SARA addressed some of the problems
with the third-party defense and enacted the "innocent landowner" defense to CERCLA
liability. The innocent landowner defense excludes from the definition of contractual
relationship the acquisition of title by innocent parties. Nevertheless, the defense is only
available to purchasers who "did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of
on, in, or at the facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A) (i). In order to establish that the defendant had no reason to know of the hazardous waste, "the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort
to minimize liability." Id. § 9601(35) (B).
This "innocent landowner" defense also excludes state and local governments acquiring "ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment" or similar means from liability as an "owner or operator." Id. § 9601(20)(D).
Instead, "any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand" is held liable. I. § 9601(20)(A)(iii). See infra note 181
(discussing EPA proposed rule on this issue).
SARA also created a federal lien in favor of the government for recovering the
costs of hazardous waste cleanups. The lien attaches only to the property subject to
cleanup and arises when the government first incurs cleanup costs or notifies the responsible party, whichever occurs first. The rights of the government are subordinated, however, to the rights of others whose interests were perfected before either notice of the lien
is filed or actual notice is received. I. § 9607(1).
13 A secured creditor is one with a security interest which is a "form of interest in
property which provides that the property may be sold on default in order to satisfy the
obligation for which the security interest is given. A mortgage is used to grant a security
interest in real property." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed. 1979). See also U.C.C. §
.1-201 (1989) (defining a security interest in personal property, or fixtures).
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definition of "owner or operator." 4 Section 9601(20) (A) of
CERCLA defines an "owner or operator" as:
in the case of an onshore facility ... any person owning or
operating such facility .... Such term does not include a person,
who, without participatingin the management of a... facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the... facility.'5
Therefore, a secured creditor is exempted from owner or operator
status under CERCLA if its activities comply with the requisite
criteria: (1) it does not participate in the management of the site,
and (2) it holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest. 6 When a secured creditor fails to meet even one of
these criteria, however, it may be found to be an "owner or operator," and, thus, face CERCLA liability. The difficulty arises in determining when a secured creditor's activities fall outside the
scope of the security interest exemption.
Although control is not explicitly stated as an element of the
security interest exemption, it is implied from both of the
exemption's criteria. Both issues - whether a secured creditor
participated in the *management of its debtor's business and
whether a secured creditor held indicia of ownership primarily to
protect its security interest - are determined by how much control the secured creditor exerted over its debtor. 7 A secured
creditor will fall outside the scope of the security interest exemption if it exercises too much control over the debtor and its business activities."8 Therefore the crucial issue becomes how much
control is too much control? In other words, what amount or

14 Section 9607(a)(1) states "owner and operator" while § 9607(a)(2) states "owner
or operator." Courts have interpreted the statutory intent as meaning "owner or operator."
Thus, a party need only own or operate a facility to face CERCLA liability. This Note
uses the phrase "owner or operator" when referring to both §§ 9607(a)(1) and
9607(a)(2). See generally United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3
(11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991)
(discussing reasons for construing § 9607(a)(1) in the disjunctive); United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986) ("[T]o slavishly follow
the laws of grammar while interpreting acts of Congress would violate sound canons of
statutory interpretation.").
15 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (emphasis added).
16 These two criteria are not separate and distinct. Accordingly, they must be examined together. See infra text accompanying notes 178, 214-15.
17 See infra part III A.
18 See id.
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degree of control must a lender exert over a debtor to lose the
security interest exemption?
The statutory language of CERCLA does not specify the degree of control required for a secured creditor to fall outside the
scope of the security interest exemption. Likewise, CERCLA's legislative history is silent as to the requisite degree of control. 19
Therefore, with only CERCLA's broad remedial policy as insight
into the legislature's intent, it is necessary for courts to turn to
common-law principles of lender liability in order to determine
the allowable degree of control under CERCLA. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "[i]f a statute is ambiguous or its meaning .uncertain, it should be construed in connection with the common law in force when the statute was enacted."2" Additionally, there is a "presumption that the law-makers
did not intend to abrogate or alter it [the common law] in any
manner ...

'

Therefore, since Congress left unclear the defini-

19 Representative Harsha of Ohio, who introduced the security interest exemption
stated:
This change is necessary because the original definition inadvertently subjected
those who hold title to a ... facility, but do not participate in the management
or operation and are not othenuise affiliated with the person leasing or operating
the .. . facility, to the liability provisions of the bill.
Remarks of Rep. Harsha, reprinted in 2 Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public
Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 A Legislative Histo of the CERCLA 945 (Comm. Print
1983), quoted in, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.11 (lth
Cir.), reh' denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
20 EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 228, at 422 (1940). S&e
United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 311 (1892) ('This statute, like all acts of Congress,
and even the Constitution itself, is to be read in the light of the common law, from
which our system of jurisprudence is derived."); United States v. Tilleraas, 709 F.2d 1088,
1092 (6th Cir. 1983) ('[T]he scope of the common law will be altered no further than
is necessary to give effect to the language of the statute."); United States v. Cox, 593
F.2d 46, 49 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[S]tatutes are to be interpreted with reference to the common law and where there is no indication to the contrary, given their common law
meaning."). See generally CRAWFORD, supr, § 228; 2B NoRMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 50.01-,05 (5th ed. 1992).
21 CRAWFORD, supra note 20, § 228, at 423. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501, rehkg denied, 474 U.S. 1090 (1986) ("[I]f
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952) ("Statutes which invade the common law ...
are to be read with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident."); Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003,
1006 (9th Cr. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990) ("[U]nless Congress has made
manifest an intent to the contrary, a presumption obtains that when Congress uses a
common law term, it intends to use it in its common law sense."); United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1966) ("[C]hanges in the common law effected by stat-
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tion of control under the security interest exemption, common-law
principles of lender liability should be used to determine the degree of control that a secured creditor
must exercise over its debt22
or so as to face CERCLA liability.
Part II of this Note analyzes and draws distinctions between
two common-law principles useful in examining the security interest exemption: agency theory and instrumentality theory. Part III
examines the inconsistency between the executive, judiciary and
congressional branches of government in interpreting CERCLA's
security interest exemption, and evaluates these inconsistent results
under common-law principles of lender liability. The EPA's final
rule on lender liability is also considered in Part III. Part IV concludes that while the judiciary should interpret CERCLA's security
interest exemption using common-law principles of lender liability,
the executive has failed to use these principles in its interpretation
of CERCLA. Therefore, an inconsistency will result between the
two branches of government, and congressional action is ultimately
needed to resolve this issue.
II.

COMMON-LAW THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY

Lenders have traditionally faced liability under the common
law. Agency and instrumentality are two of these common-law
principles which provide helpful insight into the interpretation of
CERCLA's security interest exemption. 2- Both the agency and

ute must be clearly evidenced therein."). See also SINGER, supra note 20, § 50.01, at 90.
22 Some examples of cases which have construed statutes or constitutions with reference to the common law include: United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(definition of "citizen" under the United States Constitution construed with reference to
the common law); United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.), ce7t. denied 487
U.S. 1238 (1988) (court construed common-law crime of fetal infanticide as within the
meaning of "murder" under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a)); Jones v. H.D. & J.K. Crosswell, Inc.,
60 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1932) (contracts giving right to bottle and sell Coca-Cola would
constitute intangible property under the common law, and also constitute intangible property under the Income Tax Statute since there is no indication to the contrary); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (CERCLA's liability
scheme construed with reference to the common law); Powars v. United States, 285 F.
Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (referring to the common law, citrus trees are not tangible
personal property within the meaning of § 179 of the Internal Revenue Code).
23 Other common-law theories of lender liability include equitable subordination, the
duty of good faith, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and interference with contractual relationships.
Equitable subordination allows a bankruptcy court to subordinate the claims of a
secured creditor who exercised inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Diamond, 563
F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). Unlike agency and instrumentality, this theory is inapplicable to
the present analysis as equitable subordination only considers situations where the secured
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instrumentality theories provide standards - focusing on control
for when a secured creditor will face liability for its debtor's
obligations to third parties.24 This Note does not offer these the-,
ories as separate bases for CERCLA owner or operator liability.
Rather, these common-law principles of lender liability are offered
as insight to aid the judiciary, executive, and legislature in their
quest to determine the allowable degree of control under
CERCIA's security interest exemption.
A.

Agency

-

The Creditor Liable

As A P incipal
"Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act."' Three elements must be present in order for
an agency relationship to arise: (1) a "manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him;"26 (2) an "agent's acceptance
of the undertaking;" 27 and (3) "the understanding of the parties
that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking." 28 Nevertheless, these elements need not include intent nor knowledge
of the legal consequences, of an agency relationship for such a
relationship to arise.'

creditor indirectly suffers from its conduct, rather than being held directly liable to third
parties.
The duty of good faith requires the secured creditor to perform and enforce its
contract with the debtor in good faith. See, eg., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1985); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983). This common-law theory is not addressed in this Note because it typically relates to the secured
creditor's liability to the debtor, not third parties. This same reasoning holds true for the
common-law theories of breach of fiduciary duty, see, e.g., Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of
St. Paul, 7 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979); Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen, 29 B.R.
139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); fraud, see, e.g., State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); and interference with contractual relationships, see e.g., Flintridge Station Assocs. v. American Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761 F.2d 434
(7th Cir. 1985).
24 While each state may interpret these two theories slightly differently, an examination of every jurisdiction is outside the scope of this Note.
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY'§ 1 (1957).
26 Id. cmt. b.
27 Id. This Note does not focus on these first two elements because they do not
offer insight into a lender's allowable degree of control over its borrower.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Section 14 0 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency ("the
Restatement") specifically provides when a creditor/debtor' relationship becomes an agency relationship: "A creditor who assumes
control of his debtor's business for the mutual benefit of himself and
his debtor, may become a principal, with liability for the acts and

transactions of the debtor in connection with the business. " In
other words, a creditor will be transformed into a principal and
face potential liability for its agent's actions if the creditor "assumes control." Comment (a) elaborates on the required amount
of control: A secured creditor will not become liable as a principal
by "merely exercis[ing] a veto power over the business acts of his
debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified
amounts .
".3..2A secured creditor does become a principal,
however, by "tak[ing] over the management of the debtor's business ... and direct[ing] what contracts may or may not be
made . . . ."' Therefore, when a creditor "assumes de facto control

over the conduct of his debtor"' the creditor becomes a principal and the debtor its agent. Unfortunately, neither the Comment
nor the Reporter's Notes to the Restatement nor the American
Law Institute proceedings include any further explanation of the
degree of control necessary for a secured creditor to become a
principal." Nevertheless, Professor William Seavey, the Reporter
for the Restatement, referred to the amount of control needed
under section 14 0 in his writings after the Restatement's drafting:
The situation which raises the question as to the existence of
the relation in its broadest form, as well as illustrating the
consequences of finding it, is that created when creditors, fearing the financial collapse of a debtor, assume more or less
control over his assets and business. Since Cox v. Hickman [8
H.L. Cas. 268 (1860)], the fact that the creditors are to share

30 Although the text of section 14 0 refers to a creditor and debtor, the title of this
section is "Security Holder Becoming a Principal" and the comment to this section refers

specifically to a security holder. Thus, there is a question as to whether section 14 0 pertains only to a specific type of creditor - the secured creditor. See generally J. Dennis
Hynes, Lender Liability. The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor 58 TENN. L. REV. 635, 642-43
(1991) (discussing the inconsistency between the text, title, and comment to section 14

0).
31
32
33
34
35

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 (1957) (emphasis added).
Id. cmt. a.
Id.
Id.
Hynes, supra note 30, at 637 & n.10.
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the profits of the business to the extent of their interests does
not cause them to be partners, and if they are satisfied with
giving advice they do not become liable to new creditors even
though in fact they become the direct beneficiaries of their
attempt to secure solvency for the debtor. On the other hand, if
they go beyond this and exact obedience from the debtor so that in
effect they are operatingthe debtor's business, they may lose their immunity and become liable for the debts of the concern of which they now
have become the masters.ss
In analyzing section 14 0 for the purposes of this Note - to
compare the relationship to that required under CERCLA's security interest exemption - it is necessary to address the situation
where a secured creditor becomes liable as a principal for the
torts committed by its debtor against third parties."7 To deter-

36 William Seavey, Agency Since the Restatemen 23 A.BA.J. 503, 503-04 (1936), quoted
in, William H. Lawrence, Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated With Applications to the Relational Theosy of Secured Financing, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1411 n.107
(1989) (emphasis added).
37 When a debtor disposes hazardous wastes in violation of CERCLA, this action is
more analogous to that of a tort than a contract. There is no contract between the debtor and the EPA (or other party bringing the action); rather, the debtor has committed a
wrong. Under CERCLA the debtor had a duty to dispose of hazardous waste according
to the proper procedure, and by improperly disposing of the hazardous waste the debtor
breached that duty (there is no proximate cause requirement since CERCLA imposes
strict liability). Courts finding an agency relationship between a creditor and debtor,
however, have done so in the context of the creditor being held liable as a principal for
the debtor's contracts with third parties. There is a distinction between a principal being
held liable in contract as opposed to tort. See text accompanying infra notes 38-43.
A principal is always potentially liable for authorized contracts of its agent regardless
of whether the principal is disclosed, partially disclosed, or undisclosed, or whether the
agent is a general agent or special agent. The same is not true if the contracts are unauthorized. If unauthorized, the principal's liability partly depends on whether the agent
was a general agent or a special agent - a distinction depending on "[clontinuity of
service rather than the extent of discretion or responsibility...." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENcY § 3 cmt. a (1957).
A general agent is "an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions involving
a continuity of service." Id. § 3(1). A principal will be held liable "for acts done on his
account by a general agent which are incidental to or customarily a part of a transaction
which the agent has been authorized to perform." HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 97, at 163 (1979). See
Dixie Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hamm, 344 S.W.2d 601 (Ark. 1961). There is, however,
some difference in a principal's liability for a general agent's unauthorized contracts
depending on whether the principal is disclosed, partially disclosed, or undisclosed. If the
principal is disclosed or partially disclosed, the principal will be subject to liability for a
general agent's unauthorized contracts if the unauthorized acts "usually accompany or are
incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although they are
forbidden by the principal, the [third] party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that [the agent] is not so authorized." RESTATEMENT
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mine whether a principal will be held liable for its agent's tortious
conduct, the first question is whether the principal intended the
tortious conduct. If the tort was intended by the principal, then
the principal is unquestionably liable.a This rule does not depend on the law of agency, but rather on the general rule "that
one causing and intending an act or result is as responsible as if
he had personally performed the act or produced the result."3 9
Likewise, if a secured creditor intends for its debtor to violate
CERCLA by improperly disposing hazardous wastes, the secured
creditor will face direct liability under CERCLA. In this scenario,
the security interest exemption is not even an issue, since the
secured creditor's liability is independently based. If the principal
did not intend the tortious conduct of its agent, however, the
principal's vicarious liability will depend on the amount of control
the principal exercised over its agent's conduct, i.e., whether the
principal was a master and the agent its servant.
"A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform
service in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control
the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service.' While control is the focus of this relationship, '"it is not
so much the actual exercise of control as possession of the right
to control which is determinative." Once the requisite degree of

(SECOND)

OF AGENCY § 161 (1957).

If the principal is undisclosed, however, a general

agent will subject the principal to liability for unauthorized contracts if the unauthorized
acts are "usual or necessary in such [authorized]

transactions, although forbidden by the

principal to do them." Id. § 194.
On the other hand, a special agent is "an agent authorized to conduct a single

transaction or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service." Id. § 3(2). With
few exceptions, a principal is not bound by the unauthorized acts of a special agent. See
generally REUSCHLEN & GREGORY, supra, § 97, at 163-64 (discussing specifically when a
special agent can hold its principal liable for the agent's unauthorized acts).
Since debtors found to be agents under section 14 0 are general agents, RESrATE-

MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 Cmt. a (1957), the secured creditors will face liability
even for the debtors' unauthorized contracts (if all of the above elements are met).
38 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1957). See 2 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1856, at 1437 (1914) ("If the act be one which was
specifically and immediately directed by the principal, it may be charged to him as being
really his own act, the servant or agent intervening merely as a mechanical instrument.").
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 cmt. a (1957).

40 1& § 2(1). Likewise, a servant is "an agent employed by a master to perform
service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master." Id. § 2(2).
41 REusCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 37, § 50, at 99. Agency law concerns itself
with the distinction between principal and agent, master and servant, and employer and
independent contractor. An agent has the right to bind the principal in contract, while a
servant does not. A servant, on the other hand, can hold the master liable for the
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control is present, masters are subject to liability for their servants'
tortious conduct "committed while acting in the scope of their employment."2 This is the doctrine of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Therefore, for a principal/creditor to be held liable
for the unintended (by the creditor) torts of its agent/debtor, two
elements must be met: (1) the creditor must exercise, or have the
right to exercise, control over the physical conduct of the debtor,
and (2) the debtor must have been acting within the scope of its
employment when the tort was committed.4' If these two elements are met, the debtor's tortious conduct will be imputed to
the creditor.
1. Whether the Creditor Exercised, Or Had the Right to
Exercise, Control Over the Physical Conduct of the Debtor
Considering the first element - whether the creditor exercised, or had the right to exercise, control over the physical conduct of the debtor - section 14 0 actually considers this element
in determining whether an agency relationship arose between a
creditor and debtor. Section 14 0 requires the creditor to exercise
de facto control over the debtor's business, in other words physical control over the debtor's business. Professor Seavey, writing
about section 14 0, referred to the creditor as a master: "[If the
creditor] exact[s] obedience from the debtor so that in effect [the
creditor is] ...

operating the debtor's business, [the creditor]

may lose [its] immunity and become liable for the debts of the
concern of which [the creditor] now ha[s] become the master[]."4
Therefore, since such a high degree of control - de facto control
- is required for a creditor to become liable as a principal, this
principal/agency analysis of section 14 0 can be used to deter-

servant's tortious conduct, while an agent cannot. An independent contractor has neither
the power to bind the "principal" contractually, nor the power to hold the "principal"
liable for tortious conduct. Rather, an independent contractor "is one who performs
services for his constituent but does so neither as servant or as agent." Id. at 100.
The use of these terms to denote three different relationships is often criticized
since very often a master/servant relationship will also be a principal/agent relationship.
See generally, id.at 101-112 (discussing master/servant relationship as opposed to principal/agent relationship and independent contractor in more detail).
42 RESATrEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
43 "Employment" in the context of the creditor/debtor relationship is broader than
the common usage of the term, and, therefore, can cause confusion. It does not mean
that the agent/debtor is on the principle/creditor's payroll. For a further discussion of

scope of employment, see infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
44 Seavey, supra note 36, at 504.
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mine whether a creditor is liable as a master for the unauthorized
torts of the debtor. In other words, if a creditor is found to fulfill
the requisite degree of control under section 14 0, it will also be
found to be a master and, thus, potentially liable for the tortious
conduct of the debtor. 45
Since the commentary on section 14 0 is sparse, case law
must be examined to determine the threshold of control required
under section 14 0 which constitutes de facto control, thereby
giving rise to master liability for an agent's tortious conduct. It is
important to note that cases considering a creditor's conduct in
the context of section 14 0 have done so to determine whether
the creditor is liable for the debtor's contracts. This analysis is
different than that required to determine a creditor's liability for
its debtor's torts.' Therefore, these cases are not used for a final
resolution on the issue of creditor liability, but rather as examples
of what factors constitute de facto control and, thus, fulfill the
first requirement of the master/servant analysis.
In A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 7 the case cited
most often for finding an agency relationship between a creditor
and debtor,4" the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the financial and managerial control assumed by Cargill (the secured
creditor) over the operation of Warren Grain & Seed Company
(the debtor) established an agency relationship whereby the secured creditor was liable for the debtor's obligations to 86
50
farmers.4 9 In 1964 the debtor, an operator of a grain elevator,
and the secured creditor entered into an agreement whereby the
secured creditor loaned money for working capital to the debtor
on an "open account" up to a stated limit of $175,000. This agreement was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's real estate and a
chattel mortgage on its inventories of grain and merchandise. The

45 S&e Lawrence, supra note 36, at 1413 ("This requirement [de facto control under
section 14 0] is consistent with general tort and agency law concepts concerning a
principal's tort liability to third persons.").
46 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.

47 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
48 Lawrence, supra note 36, at 1416.
49 309 N.W.2d at 287-88. The plaintiffs were eighty-six individual, partnership or
corporate farmers. These farmers brought this action because the debtor "defaulted on
the contracts made with plaintiffs for the sale of grain." Id. at 287.
50 The debtor purchased cash or market grain from local farmers. The cash grain
was resold through the Minneapolis Grain Exchange or to the terminal grain companies
directiy. Additionally, the debtor stored grain for farmers; sold chemicals, fertilizer and
steel storage bins; and, operated a seed business where seed grain was bought from farmers, processed, and resold for seed to farmers and local elevators. Id. at 288.
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debtor received funds and paid its expenses by issuing drafts
drawn on the secured creditor through Minneapolis banks. These
drafts were imprinted with both the secured creditor's and the
debtor's names. Proceeds from the debtor's sales were deposited
with the secured creditor and credited to its account. Additionally,
the debtor appointed the secured creditor as its grain agent for
transaction with the Commodity Credit Corporation, and the secured creditor was given a right of first refusal to purchase market
grain sold by the debtor to the terminal market."1
In 1967 the debtor and secured creditor negotiated a new
contract. This new contract increased the "open account" to a
$300,000 limit, required the debtor to furnish the secured creditor
with annual financial statements, provided the secured creditor
with the right of access to the debtor's books for inspection, and
required either the secured creditor to keep the books for the
debtor or an independent firm to conduct an audit.5 2 Additionally, this new contract required the secured creditor's prior approval
before the debtor did any of the following: (1) made capital improvements or repairs in excess of $5,000, (2) encumbered its
assets or became liable as a guarantor on another's indebtedness,
and (3) declared a dividend or sold and purchased stock."
One of the secured creditor's memos reflected its attitude
toward the debtor: "'This organization [the debtor] needs very
strong paternal guidance.'"' Between 1967 and 1973 the secured
creditor reviewed the debtor's operations and expenses, and recommended that certain actions be taken.5 5 The debtor purchased

51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. Shortly after this second contract was negotiated, the secured creditor visited
the debtor and examined the annual statements, the accounts receivable, expenses, inventory, seed, machinery, and other financial matters. The secured creditor informed the
debtor that it would be reminded periodically to make improvements recommended by
the secured creditor. Id.
54 Id. at 289.
55 Although the secured creditor suggested numerous changes to the debtor, apparently none of the ideas were implemented. These changes included:
(1) a reduction of seed grain and cash grain inventories; (2) improved collection of accounts receivable; (3) reduction or elimination of its wholesale seed
business and its specialty grain operation; (4) marketing fertilizer and steel bins
on consignment; (5) a reduction in withdrawals made by officers; (6) a suggestion that [the debtor's] bookkeeper not issue her own salary checks; and (7)
cooperation with [the secured creditor] in implementing the recommendations.
Id. at 289 n.4.
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various business forms and received sample forms printed by the
secured creditor in order to develop its own business forms.5 6
The security agreement was again renegotiated and the "open
account" line was increased to $750,000, and then later it was
raised to $1,250,000.1 7 As the debtor's unpaid obligations continued to grow in excess of its credit line, the secured creditor's
control over the debtor's financial operations continued to increase."8 In 1975 the secured creditor began to keep a daily debit
position on the debtor, and in 1976 a bank account was opened
in the debtor's name and funded by drafts drawn on the secured
creditor by the bank.59
Nevertheless, in 1977 an audit of the debtor revealed that the
debtor was $4 million in debt. The secured creditor, realizing that
the debtor's financial statements had been deliberately falsified,
refused to extend any additional financing to the debtor. The
debtor ceased operations, and in the debtor's final days the secured creditor supervised the winding down operations of the
elevator, including disbursement of funds and income generated
by the elevator.'
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the secured creditor had become the debtor's principal and, as such, was liable on
the contracts the debtor had entered into with the plaintiffs. The
court found that the relationship between the secured creditor
and the debtor fulfilled the three requirements of an agency: (1)
the secured creditor manifested its consent that the debtor would
act as its agent by directing the debtor to implement its recommendations,6 ' (2) the debtor acted on behalf of the secured
creditor by procuring grain for the secured creditor,62 and (3)
the secured creditor interfered with the internal affairs of the
6
debtor, and, thus, exercised de facto control of the elevator.

56

Id. at 289.

57
58

Id.
Id. The secured creditor told the debtor that a regional manager would be work-

ing with the debtor "on a day-to-day basis as well as in monthly planning meetings." Id.
The secured creditor took the attitude that since its money was being used, the debtor
"should realize that [the secured creditor] had the right to make some critical decisions
regarding the use of the funds." Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 291.
62 Id. ("[The debtor] acted on [the secured creditor's] behalf in procuring grain for
[the secured creditor] as the part of its normal operations which were totally financed by
[the secured creditor].").
63 Id.
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The court found a number of factors indicative of de facto control:
(1) [The secured creditor's] constant recommendations to [the
debtor] by telephone; (2) [The secured creditor's] right of first
of refusal on grain; (3) [The debtor's] inability to enter into
mortgages, to purchase stock or to pay dividends without [the
secured creditor's] approval; (4) [The secured creditor's] right
of entry onto [the debtor's] premises to carry on periodic
checks and audits; (5) [The secured creditor's] correspondence
and criticism regarding [the debtor's] finances, officers salaries
and inventory; (6) [The secured creditor's] determination that
[the debtor] needed "strong paternal guidance;" (7) Provision
of drafts and forms to [the debtor] upon which [the secured
creditor's] name was imprinted; (8) Financing of all [the
debtor's] purchases of grain and operating expenses; and (9)
[The secured creditor's] power to discontinue the financing of
[the debtor's] operations.'
Although the court "recognize[d] that some of these elements .. .
it
are found in an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship,"'
stressed that the elements must be considered in the context of
the secured creditor's "aggressive financing" of the debtor - not
as isolated elements.' The secured creditor was "an active participant in [the debtor's] operations rather than simply a finan"in essence, the owner of the operation .... .'
cier"6' Therefore, the court held the secured creditor liable as a principal
for its debtor-agent's unpaid obligations to the plaintiff-farmers,
because the secured creditor's activities constituted de facto control over the debtor.
Other decisions considering whether a secured creditor has
exercised the requisite degree of control under section 14 0 concur with Cargill as to what factors constitute de facto control.'

64 Id.
65 Id
66 Id.
67 Id. at 292.
68 Id.
69 &e, 4g., Save Way Oil Co. v. Mehlman, 496 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
In this case, Save Way Oil Company (plaintiff) delivered fuel oil to a premises operated
by Mehlman (the debtor). Jamaica Savings Bank (the secured creditor) held a mortgage
on the premises, and plaintiff brought an action against the secured creditor as a principal for the cost of the unpaid fuel oil delivered to the debtor.'
The facts indicating that the secured creditor exercised a sufficient degree of control over the debtor to be held liable as a principal included the following- (1) the se-
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One decision is repeatedly cited, however, as disagreeing with
Cargill and narrowing the degree of control required under section 14 0. 7o Buck v. Nash-Finch Co. 71 held that the secured creditor did not exert enough control over the debtor to be held liable
under an agency theory. Lawrence "Doc" Boedeker (the debtor)
operated a market in Mitchell, South Dakota. The Nash Finch
Company (the secured creditor)7 2 suggested to the debtor, its

cured creditor opened a joint bank account with the debtor and the checks drawn on
this account bore on their face both the names of the secured creditor and debtor, and
(2) some of plaintiff's previous bills for fuel oil were paid with these checks. Id. at 538.
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against the secured
creditor, and, likewise, denied the secured creditor's motion for summary judgment. On
appeal, the court, relying on section 14 0, ruled that there were material issues of fact
as to whether the secured creditor exercised the requisite degree of control to be held
liable as a principal. Therefore, the granting of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
was reversed and the denial of the secured creditor's motion for summary judgment was
upheld. Id.
This decision supports a broad interpretation of section 14 0 since the denial of
the secured creditor's motion for summary judgment was upheld when the facts only
indicated that the secured creditor's control, at best, extended to the financial aspects of
the debtor's ordering of fuel oil from plaintiff, and not the actual management of
debtor's fuel oil orders.
See also Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984), appeal after remand, 498 N.Y.S.2d 453 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). In this case, Plymouth Rock Fuel Corporation (plaintiff) brought this action against Leucadia (the secured
creditor) to recover the cost of heating oil delivered and service repair calls made to
three buildings owned and operated by Isaac Silverman (the debtor). The court found
that the secured creditor exercised the requisite degree of control in the following ways:
(1) the secured creditor, a second mortgagee of the buildings, paid the debtor's bills to
plaintiff for nearly three years, (2) the debtor assigned to the secured creditor all the
rents and profits derived from the operation of the buildings, with the tenants paying
their rent directly to the secured creditor, (3) although the debtor performed the day-today operations in the buildings, the secured creditor constantly communicated with the
debtor and approved all of the debtor's expenditures, and (4) the secured creditor drew
all checks and made all disbursements for expenses in operating the buildings, including
payroll expenses. Id. at 80-81.
Thus, the court found that the secured creditor exercised the required degree of
control under section 14 0 - albeit financial control - and, thus, became liable as a principal for the fuel delivered to the debtor's buildings.
See also Anderson v. Texxann Indus., Inc., 824 P.2d 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
70 Most of the other decisions employing a different standard than Cargill were decided prior to the publication of section 14 0. See, e.g., Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp.,
156 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1946); Ford v. C.E. Wilson & Co., 129 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1942);
Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig, 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658
(1939); Commercial Credit v. LA. Benson Co., 184 A. 236 (Md. 1936); Kelly v. Tracy &
Avery Co., 73 N.E. 455 (Ohio 1905). See also Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank of
Brush, 552 P.2d 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (secured creditor held not liable as principal
without reference to section 14 0).
71 102 N.W.2d 84 (S.D. 1 960).
72 The secured creditor, a wholesaler of merchandise, financed the debtor through
its wholly owned subsidiary, the Merchants Finance Company. Id. at 85.
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customer, that he undertake a larger operation. This suggestion
was acted upon by the debtor when his market burned down in
August 1965, and thereafter the debtor contracted to build a
Piggly Wiggly markeL7 The secured creditor financed the
debtor's endeavor with a $50,000 loan, of which, at the insistence
of the secured creditor, almost $20,000 was used in stocking the
store.

74

As in Cargil the secured creditor became heavily involved
with the internal financial operations of the debtor. After the
initial loans, the secured creditor and the- debtor entered into an
arrangement whereby the secured creditor did the accounting for
the market.75 One of the secured creditor's accountants visited
the store twice a week, made up the payroll, entered checks on
the register, and compiled an operating report every week and a
financial statement at five week intervals. Then, early in 1957, the
accountant began to countersign all checks issued by the debtor.7' These facts indicated that the secured creditor had a large

degree of control over the debtor's financial decisions.
As with the exchange of grain between the debtor and secured creditor in CargiU; merchandise was.exchanged between the
debtor and secured creditor' in Nash-Finch. The debtor purchased
merchandise from the secured creditor according to a check with
order requirement. 77 The secured creditor in Nash-Finch also mirrored the actions of the secured creditor in Cargill by keeping in
constant contact with the operations and financial condition of the

73 The debtor contracted with the Piggly Wiggly Company and the Metzger Company for a Piggly Wiggly franchise. Id.
74 Id. Initially, the secured creditor extended a loan of $30,000 to the debtor, but
when it became apparent that more money .as needed for the endeavor, an additional
$20,000 loan was extended to the debtor. Id. This loan was secured by chattel mortgages
on the fixtures, equipment and stock of merchandise, real estate mortgages on two residence properties, and an assignment of insurance contracts on the life of the debtor. Id.
75 The secured creditor was able to provide this service through its Retail Service
Divisions which provided advertising, merchandising, and accounting services. The debtor
paid a monthly fee for the accounting services. Id.

76 Id.
77 Id. In essence, merchandise was provided to the debtor by the secured creditor
with the understanding that it would be paid for up-front by the debtor. After the initial
loans, the debtor received almost no additional credit. Id.
Nevertheless, the debtor did not purchase all of his merchandise from the secured
creditor. The debtor was in the practice of purchasing large shipments of coffee and
cigarettes which were then resold at wholesale to other merchants. To avoid paying a
percentage for these wholesale transactions under his Piggly Wiggly franchise contract, the
debtor did not run them through his register, but rather retained the cash separately. Id.
at 85-86.
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store, which only increased as the debtor's financial stability decreased. In late 1956 it became apparent that the market was not
doing so well. The secured creditor wanted the debtor to hire an
experienced and skilled store manager, and after some initial
resistance by the debtor, the secured creditor introduced the debtor to Estel Parshall. 8 In April 1957 the debtor hired Parshall as
his store manager." Initially, the secured creditor subsidized
Parshall's payroll, and Parshall's duties as store manager were defined by the secured creditor.' These duties resulted in a reorganization of the methods by which the debtor ran his store.8 l Nevertheless, even with Parshall as the new store manager, the debtor
remained predominately in charge of buying merchandise for the
store. 2
After Parshall's appointment, the secured creditor still continued its service visits, advice, and help as before. Nevertheless, except when the cash in the bank was insufficient to meet a check
upon presentation, the secured creditor's accountant did not refuse to prepare and countersign any check requested by the debtor.' This procedure of operation continued until September 20,

78 From the outset, the debtor was against hiring a store manager as the secured
creditor suggested. According to the debtor, when he was introduced to Estel Parshall,
the secured creditor made the debtor feel that he "'had to get along with Estel or else.'"
Id. at 86. The debtor took this to mean that he had to hire Parshall or else the secured
creditor would foreclose on the loans. Id.
79 Id.
80 After Parshall was hired, the secured creditor sent a memo to the debtor describing Parshall's duties. During the trial, however, the debtor disputed his agreement regarding these duties. The debtor stated that it had been his understanding that "Parshall was
to come in to help him with advertising and promotions, and to take charge of the
produce department; they would talk over store problems; they would each draw $75 per
week; and buying from sources other than [the secured creditor] would be discontinued
as soon as possible." Id. at 87-88. Nevertheless, what actually happened after Parshall was
hired was more in line with the duties outlined by the secured creditor. See id.
81 Parshall handled all the money coming into the store, as well as all the money
going out of the store. Parshall checked the cash registers, made the deposits, changed
the locks on the store, and handled all payouts and the payroll. Parshall also handled all
the books and records needed for the secured creditor's accountant, with the goal being
that Parshall would eventually assume the duties of the accountant. The debtor and
Parshall were to jointly be in charge of the personnel and overall store problems including expense and promotion. Nevertheless, Parshall, after seeking advice from the secured
creditor, fired the debtor's stepson. Id. at 88. Additionally, the debtor's practice of keeping the cash separate from his wholesale transactions was discontinued, and eventually the
practice of buying merchandise from sources other than the secured creditors was to be
discontinued.
82 Nevertheless, Parshall, as head of the produce department, purchased merchandise
for that department. Id. at 91.
83 Id. at 88.
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1957, when the debtor sold his store to the Piggly Wiggly Hills
Company, a corporation in which the secured creditor held a
controlling interest. Thereafter, unpaid creditors of the debtor
brought an action against the secured creditor.
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly
ruled that the secured creditor was the undisclosed principal of
the debtor, and, as such, liable for the unpaid obligations of the
debtor on merchandise sold and delivered to his store. s4 Although the appellate court "experienced no difficulty in discovering a basis in the evidence warranting a finding of an assumption
of control by [the secured creditor] ....
and a yielding of acting
under such control by [the debtor] . . ," the court stated that
the real issue was whether the degree of control extended to that
part of the debtor's business involved in buying merchandise. 8
In other words, did the secured creditor merely exercise a veto
power over the debtor's purchases of merchandise, or did it actually take over the management of the debtor's merchandise purchases? Although the secured creditor ultimately planned to become the sole supplier of the debtor's merchandise, this plan was
never implemented. 7 The court viewed .the secured creditor as
only having control over the merchandise purchases to the extent
that the accountant refused to countersign checks when there was
not enough money in the bank.' Therefore, the court held that
the creditor had a veto power over the debtor's purchases of merchandise, and, as such, this veto power was not enough to find
the secured creditor liable as a principal for the debtor's unpaid
purchases of merchandise. 9
The Nash-Finch decision is not the proper analysis by which to
determine a creditor's allowable degree of control under section
14 0. Relying on three cases decided prior to the publication of
section 14 O,' Nash-Finch improperly analyzed the Restatement.
The court failed to examine the creditor-debtor relationship in its

84

I& at 84.

85

Id. at 89-90.

86 Id.
87 Id. at 91. Since the secured creditor was not at the point where it wanted to
grant credit to the debtor for the purchases, the plan was never implemented. The court
focused on this fact, reasoning that this was "the only hint of criticism of [the debtor] as
a buyer ....
"Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 91.
90 Id- at 92.
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entirety, and instead only narrowly focused on the amount of
control the creditor exercised over the debtor's buying operations. 1 The secured creditor did exercise, however, de facto control over the debtor's entire business - it instigated the debtor's
investment into the Store, financed the debtor's investment of the
store, provided internal financial management of the debtor's
store, made constant recommendations to the debtor, approved all
expenditures by the debtor, had a right of entry onto the debtor's
premises to carry on periodic checks and audits (and through
Parshall was constantly present), controlled the purchasing of
produce merchandise (also through Parshall), and eventually benefitted when the debtor sold his store to a corporation in which
the secured creditor held a controlling interest. The secured creditor in Cargill and the secured creditor in Nash-Finch did not exercise control through the exact same activities (although some were
the same), but taken together the activities of the secured creditor
in Nash-Finch exhibit an agency relationship between the secured
creditor and the debtor according to the standards applied in
Cargill While it is arguable that the Cargill standards are incorrect,
Cargill is consistent with cases decided subsequent to the publication of section 14 0. Furthermore, the Nash-Finch decision is dependent upon cases decided prior to section 14 0. Additionally,
Cargill holds up under the agency analysis while Nash-Finch does
not. Since the Nash-Finch court admitted that there was an assumption of control by the secured creditor, it should not have focused
on whether the secured creditor exercised complete control over
all aspects of the debtor's business. Instead, the court should have
determined that an agency relationship had indeed been established between the secured creditor who exercised de facto control and the debtor who yielded to this control. This analysis is
supported by Cargill Once the agency relationship was established,
then the Nash-Finch court would have to inquire into whether the
principal/secured creditor was liable for its agent/debtor's contracts under the typical analysis of principal liability in contract.92
In other words, the Nash-Finch inquiry should not have been
whether there was an agency relationship, but whether the prin-

91 Labeling the Buck court's analysis a "narrow perspective," one commentator stated,
"Unlike other control cases, the court focused on one element of the parties' relationship, albeit an important one, the buying operations. However, it failed to examine the
entire relationship between the parties." K. Thor Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a
Control Relationship with its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 537-38 (1984).
92 See supra note 37.
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cipal was liable for the agent's buying contracts. By focusing on
whether the secured creditor exercised complete control over
every facet of the debtor's business, the Nash-Finch court actually
analyzed the secured creditor's liability under the instrumentality
theory.9' Therefore, the standards employed in Cargill are the
proper methods for determining whether a secured creditor exercised de facto control.
2. Whether
employment

the

debtor

was

acting

within

the

scope

of

The second element of agency liability, whether or not an
agent/debtor' was acting within the scope of its employment so
as to hold its principal/creditor liable for its tortious acts, is, as
with the issue of control, a fact-specific inquiry. "Within the scope
of employment" refers to "those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods,
even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of
the employment." 5 An agent's conduct is considered within the
'scope of employment only if: "(a) it is of the kind [the agent] is
employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master. . . ."9 Therefore, if the
agent's conduct is authorized by the principal, it is considered
within the scope of employment. 7 If the conduct is unauthorized, however, it will only be within the scope of employment if it
is "of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to
the conduct authorized." 8 Factors to be considered when determining whether unauthorized conduct is within the scope of employment include:

93 See infra part II B.
94 This Note uses the terms "servant" and "agent" as well as "master" and "principal"
interchangeably since a creditor will only be a principal if it exercises the requisite degree of control required to become a master.
95 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at
502 (5th ed. 1984).
96 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957). The fourth requirement, that
the servant's use of force is not unexpectable by the master, is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note.
97 Id. § 215.
98 Id. § 229.
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(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such
servants; (b) the time, place and purpose of the act; (c) the
previous relations between the master and the servant; (d) the
extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different servants; (e) whether or not the act is outside
the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has
not been entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done; (g) the
similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized; (h)
whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done
has been furnished by the master to the servant; (i) the extent
of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an
authorized result; and (j) whether or not the act is seriously
criminal.'
Such an inquiry is obviously very fact specific and can only be
determined on a case-by-case basis."°
Therefore, for purposes of interpreting the degree of control
permitted a creditor under CERCLA's security interest exemption,
the common-law theory of agency provides well-established standards for when a secured creditor will be held liable for its
debtor's tortious conduct. A secured creditor will face such liability
when it exercises de facto control over its debtor's conduct. If de
facto control is present, the creditor becomes a master and the
debtor its servant, with liability attaching to the debtor's tortious
conduct performed within the scope of employment.
B.

The Instrumentality Theory
or Alter Ego Doctrine

The instrumentality or alter ego rule10 ' is a common-law
doctrine which allows a corporation to be held liable for the debts
of another corporation when it misuses that corporation as a mere
instrumentality or when the subservient corporation becomes the
alter ego of the dominant corporation.0 2 Courts generally apply

99 Id. § 229(2).
100 See generaly W. PAGE KEEON Er AL, supra note 95, §§ 69-70.
101 While the "instrumentality" or "alter ego" rule is probably the term most frequently used to describe this doctrine, courts also use other terms such as the "identity"
theory, "agent, adjunct, branch, dummy, department, or tool." Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v.
Nat'l Distillers and Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973). See infra part II C
(comparing and contrasting the instrumentality and agency theories).
102 This Note only discusses the "instrumentality" doctrine as applied to lenders. For
a discussion of this doctrine as applied to parent corporations, see, e.g., Robert C. Clark,
The Duties of the Corporation Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1977); Asa S.
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a two-prong test in determining whether to invoke this doctrine.
First, the dominant corporation must have controlled the subservient corporation. Second, the dominant corporation must have
proximately
caused the plaintiff harm by misusing that con0 3s
trol.
When applied to debtor/creditor relationships, the test is
refined so that the first prong requires actua, total control'°
Thus, under this common-law doctrine, liability for the obligations
of the debtor is imposed where a creditor's control over a
debtor's business and financial affairs is so dominant that either
the creditor has become the alter ego 'of10 5the debtor or the debtor
has become the creditor's 'instrument."'
Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers and Chemical
Corp." is the leading authority on when a creditor becomes a
debtor's alter ego. 10 7 In Krivo ten creditors (plaintiffs) of Brad's
Machine Products (the debtor) sued National Distillers and

Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L
REv. 83 (1961); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate
Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L REV. 589 (1975); Notes, Piercing the Corporate Law
Veil. The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982).
103 Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management ParticipationUnder Section
101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 942 (1989). Some courts also require a third element, namely "'use of control by the [dominant corporation] to commit fraud or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of legal rights, or to perpetrate a violation of
statutory or other positive duty.. . ...'" Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination
and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of "Control", 65 TEx. L REV.
801, 838 (1987). This third element is included, however, in the second requirement of
the previously stated two-prong test in that the plaintiff's harm must be proximately
caused through misuse by the dominant corporation.
This Note does not discuss the second prong of this test any further since CERCLA
imposes strict liability.
104 Tom, supra note 103, at 942.
105 Lundgren, supra note 91, at 523-24.
106 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
107 For other cases holding that secured creditors did not exert enough control to
be held liable under the instrumentality theory, see, e.g., Valdes v. Leisure Resource
Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345, 1352-56 (5th Cir. 1987); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.
Keig, 98 F.2d 952, 959-68 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939); Chicago Mill
& Lumber Co. v. Boatman's Bank, 234 F. 41, 45-46 (8th Cir. 1916); cf. Credit Managers
Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
For cases employing the same standard, but holding the secured creditor liable
under the instrumentality theory, see, e.g., Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d 460 (1st
Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934); American Nat'l Bank v. National Wall-Paper
Co., 77 F. 85 (8th Cir. 1896); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp.
376 (W.D. Ark. 1951); In re Otsego Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Mich.
1935); Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 280 F. 879 (M.D.
Ala.).
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Chemical Corporation (the secured creditor) for the debtor's
unpaid obligations, claiming that the debtor was a mere instrumentality of the secured creditor. In 1966 the debtor, a machine
production business owned by John and Mary Bradford, became
involved in the munitions industry and contracted with the government to produce M-125 fuses, the principal component of which
was brass. The secured creditor supplied the majority of brass to
the debtor for the production of these fuses, which accounted for
ninety percent of the debtor's gross sales. The debtor devised a
unique system for manufacturing these fuses, and, at first,
prospered. Nevertheless, the debtor's numerous108investments eventually drained the business's financial resources.
In early 1969, the secured creditor was shipping the debtor
approximately $400,000 to $500,000 worth of brass every month,
and by March of that same year, the debtor owed the secured
creditor approximately $1,000,000.1' At the debtor's request, the
secured creditor agreed to transform this debt into a promissory
note secured by a mortgage on some of the debtor's property.
After this agreement, the secured creditor continued to supply
brass to the debtor, with payments to be made by the debtor
within a month after receiving the shipment. Nevertheless, the
debtor's unpaid debt to the secured creditor continued to increase, with the debtor building up an additional $630,000 in
accounts payable. 10
In August 1969, with the debtor facing financial ruin, the
debtor and secured creditor entered into an agreement"' whereby the secured creditor would: (1) provide internal financial management assistance to help the debtor eliminate costly waste,112
(2) lend the debtor another $600,000 in cash, (3) defer payment
(4) assist the debtor in
on the $630,000 accounts receivable,"

108 483 F.2d at 1107.
109 Id. at 1107.
110 Id- at 1107-08.
111 It was actually many oral and written agreements entered into by the debtor and
secured creditor. Id at 1108-09.
112 The secured creditor sent one of its "Internal Auditors" to oversee the debtor's finances and "to establish control procedures for managing cash and investments." Id at
1108. This "Internal Auditor" remained with the debtor for fifteen months, during which
time the secured creditor loaned the debtor an additional $169,000 and deferred almost
another $668,000 in accounts payable by the debtor to the secured creditor. Id at 1109.
113 In exchange for the $600,000 cash loan and the $630,000 in unpaid accounts
receivable, the secured creditor became a mortgagee of the debtor's plant, and gained a
security interest in the plant's furniture and fixtures. Additionally, the debtor assigned to
the secured creditor some shares of stock in other corporations, several oil and gas leas-
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liquidating unprofitable holdings to provide more capital, and (5)
intervene with
the government to prevent cancellation of the cur11 4

rent contract.

After examining these facts under the instrumentality theory
of lender liability, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's directed verdict in favor of the secured creditor. Discussing when a
lender's actions fulfill the control requirement of the first prong
of the instrumentality test, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The general rule is that the mere loan of money by one corporation to another does not automatically make the lender liable
for the acts and omissions of the borrower .... If a lender

becomes so involved with its debtor that it is in fact actively
managing the debtor's affairs, then the quantum of control
necessary to support liability under the 'instrumentality' theory
may be achieved.
An examination of 'instrumentality' cases involving creditor-debtor relationships demonstrates that courts require a
strong showing that the creditor assumed actual, participatory,
total control of the debtor. Merely taking an active part in the
management of the debtor corporation does not automatically
constitute control, as used
in the 'instrumentality' doctrine, by
115
the creditor corporation.

Examining whether the secured creditor exercised "actual, participatory, total control" over the debtor, the Fifth Circuit held that
the requisite degree of control under the instrumentality doctrine
was not present for the following reasons: (1) although stock ownership "is a factor to be considered in assessing the relationship

.

. .,"11 plaintiffs never established that the stock in

the

debtor's business was actually transferred to the secured creditor;" 7 (2) the secured creditor "considered control of [the debtor] to be, at most, only partly shared between [the secured creditor and the debtor];"11 and (3) the secured creditor "narrowly
es, and all of the capital stock in the debtor's business. These latter assets were to be
sold with the proceeds returned to the debtor. Id.at 1108.
114 The secured creditor telephoned a government official to assure the official of
the secured creditor's intent to aid the debtor. Id.at 1108.
115 Id.at 1104-05 (emphasis added).
116 Id.at 1109. Stock held by the secured creditor in the debtor corporation does
not per se resolve the question of control. The fact that the secured creditor "held no
stock ownership interest in the .. . [debtor] corporation has not precluded application
of the 'instrumentality' rule where actual and total control has been otherwise established." Id. at 1104 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 1109.
118 Id at 1110. The court looked at a letter from the secured creditor to the debtor
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restricted [its activities] to safeguarding its interests as a major
creditor of the [debtor's]" and the secured creditor only
decisionmaking
[of
the
"participated
in
the
corporate
debtor's] ... to a limited degree
.""' Although the secured
creditor provided internal financial management, lent money to
the debtor while at the same time deferring payment of outstanding loans, and actually managed portions of the debtor's business
in a limited capacity, this was not enough control to meet the
instrumentality standard of "actual, participatory, total control."
C.

The Agency Theory v. Instrumentality Theory

Neither the agency theory nor the instrumentality theory
contains bright-line rules; rather, both require fact-specific inquiries. Nevertheless, each theory is based upon a different level of
control and results in a different standard of liability. Agency requires a lesser degree of control and results in a more restricted
standard of liability than does the instrumentality theory. Under
the common-law theory of agency, a secured creditor will be held
liable for its debtor's tortious conduct if the secured creditor exercises de facto control over the debtor's conduct, and the debtor is
acting within the scope of its employment. De facto control is not
120
present if the secured creditor merely exercises a veto power,
shares in the profits to the extent of its interest,121 and gives advice periodically. 122 Rather, the factors indicative of de facto control include: 12 (1) taking over the management of the debtor's

stating that the debtor "voluntarily shared control" with the secured creditor, the fact that
the secured creditor wanted to fire John Bradford, but did not feel it had the power to
do so; and, the fact that the secured creditor could have only fired the debtor's personnel by cutting off the loans and credit and, thus, putting the debtor out of business. I&
119 I The court focused on the fact that the secured creditor's "Internal Auditor"
was sent at the debtor's request, not "thrust upon [the debtor] unwanted or unneeded."
Id. The "Internal Auditor" approved most, if not all, of the debtor's purchase orders and
signed all checks for the debtor's account. Nevertheless, the court concluded that these
were merely veto powers, and the "Internal Auditor's" management powers did not extend beyond "those decisions having an immediate effect on [the debtor's] financial
position . . . ." Id. at 1111.
For a further explanation of the three reasons the secured creditor was not held
liable, and other reasons behind the Fifth Circuit's ruling, including the finding that the
secured creditor did not abuse the debtor in a way only possible with the requisite
amount of control, see id.at 1109-14.
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 cmt. a (1957).
121 See Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80-81 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984); Seavey, supra note 36, at 504.
122 Seavey, supra note 36, at 504.
123 These factors are not inclusive, and should be examined together. The absence of
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business, 24 (2) directing what contracts are made by the debtor,1" (3) exacting obedience from the debtor, 126 (4) constantly
giving advice,127 (5) having the right of entry onto the debtor's
premises, 128 (6) paternally guiding the debtor's activities, 2 1 (7)
conducting business with documents or forms bearing the
creditor's name or both the creditor's and debtor's names,1 s3 (8)
controlling the finances of the debtor's business,' 3' and (9) using power to discontinue financial support as a leverage for con13 2

trol.

De facto control differs from the "actual, participatory, total
control" required by the instrumentality theory in that the agency
relationship can only arise if there is consent between the two
33
parties - a factor not required by the instrumentality theory.1
Additionally, regardless of the control exerted by a secured creditor under the agency theory, the secured creditor and debtor
remain separate entities - the principal and the agent. Under the
instrumentality theory, the secured creditor exerts so much control
over the debtor that the two entities cannot be distinguished from
each other - the secured creditor becomes the alter ego of the
debtor.
The latter distinction between the two theories - whether the
secured creditor and debtor are separate entities - is assured by
the second element of tort liability under the agency theory: the
debtor must be acting within the scope of its employment. No

one factor does not negate de facto control. Likewise, the presence of only one factor
does not indicate de facto control.
124 &e RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 cmt. a (1957).
125 S&eA. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981); Plymouth Rock Fue4 474 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81; RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 cmt. a
(1957).
126 See Seavey, supra note 36, at 504.
127 &e CarGi!, 309 N.W.2d at 291; Plymouth Rock Fu 474 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
128 See Cargil 309 N.W.2d at 291.
129 Se id.
130 &e id.; Save Way Oil Co. v. Mehlman, 496 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985); Plymouth Rock Fue4 474 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
131 See Cargil, 309 N.W.2d at 291; Save Way Oi4 496 N.Y.S.2d at 538; Plymouth Rock
Fuel 474 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81.
132 See Cargi/4 309 N.W.2d at 291.
133 Distinguishing between the agency and instrumentality theories in the context of
parent corporations and their subsidiaries, Judge Learned Hand wrote, "At times this [instrumentality theory] is put as though the subsidiary then became an agent of the parent. That may no doubt be true, but only in quite other situations; that is, when both
intend that relation to arise, for agency is consensual." Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake
Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929).
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such element exists under the instrumentality theory, since under
this theory all of the debtor's conduct is within the scope of its
employment for strict liability purposes."
In other words, a separate liability scheme exists under each theory. Regardless of the
de facto control exerted by a principal/creditor, it will only be
subject to liability for its agent/debtor's tortious conduct when the
conduct was within the scope of employment. This is true because
the principal and agent still remain separate entities, with liability
only extending to that conduct affected by or incidental to the de
facto control. On the other hand, if the requisite degree of control is present under the instrumentality theory, there is no further inquiry; the secured creditor is liable for its debtor's tortious
conduct. This is true because the instrumentality theory assumes
that, as the alter ego of the debtor, the secured creditor exercises
control over all aspects of the debtor's business. Thus, compared
to the agency theory, the instrumentality theory requires a higher
degree of control, and the secured creditor faces a broader standard of liability.
III.

THE THREE BRANCHES OF

GOVERNMENT

- INCONSISTENCY

Although well-established doctrines of lender liability exist in
the common law, neither the courts nor the EPA have effectively
utilized these doctrines to interpret CERCLA's security interest
exemption. Instead, the EPA and the courts have attempted to
apply this exemption to the secured creditor/debtor relationship
with little guidance from Congress as to the allowable degree of
lender control permitted under the exemption. The result has
been inconsistency within each branch of government, as well as
among the three branches of government. With the EPA's issuing
of the final rule on CERCLA's security interest exemption, and
the judiciary's mandate to interpret the security interest exemption
with reference to common-law principles, Congress must act to
resolve the inevitable confusion regarding lender liability under
CERCLA. In enacting its interpretation of the security interest
exemption, Congress should refer to well-established common-law

134 Although the instrumentality theory has a second requirement of proximate cause,
see supra note 103 and accompanying text, this negligence element is not required where
strict liability is imposed, as in CERCLA. Nevertheless, even when strict liability is imposed, the agency theory requires that the agent was acting within the scope of its employment.
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principles of lender liability (agency and instrumentality) as aids in
clarifying CERCLA.
A.

The Cours

Only two circuit courts have considered the issue of whether a
secured creditor's activities fall within the scope of the security
interest exemption. Before the issue reached these courts, howev5
er, district and bankruptcy courts had considered the issue. 1
These decisions reflected various interpretations of the security
interest exemption including: (1) in order to be considered to be
participating in the management of a facility, a secured creditor
"must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to day operationalaspects
of the site;" 36 (2) holding property for four months after fore-

135 &; e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa.
1989); United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986);
In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
136 Mirabile, 15 Envd. L. Rep. at 20,996 (emphasis added). Mirabile involved an EPA
cleanup of hazardous wastes allegedly created by Turco Coatings, Inc. (Turco) which
operated a paint manufacturing business at the contaminated site (the Turco site). In
1973 American Bank and Trust Company (the secured creditor) negotiated a loan with
Arthur C. Mangels Industries (Mangels) which was secured in part by a mortgage on the
Turco site. Three years later, Turco acquired 95 percent of Mangels' outstanding shares
and began manufacturing paint at the Turco site. The secured creditor's mortgage remained in effect throughout, and, in 1980, Turco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On
August 21, 1981, the secured creditor foreclosed on the Turco site, and on December
15, 1981, the secured creditor assigned its bid to the Mirabiles. Between August and
December, the secured creditor "secured the building against vandalism by boarding up
windows and changing locks, made inquiries as to the property, and... visited the
property on various occasions for the purpose of showing it to prospective purchasers."
Id.
Considering whether the secured creditor participated in the management of the
facility during these four months sufficiently to void the security interest exemption, se
infra note 137 (discussing whether the Mirabile secured creditor held indicia of ownership
primarily to protect security interest), the court held:
The actions undertaken by [the secured creditor] ... simply cannot be deemed
to constitute participation in the management of the site ....
[I]n enacting
CERCLA Congress manifested its intent to impose liability upon those who were
responsible for and profited from improper disposal practices. Thus, it would
appear that before a secured creditor ...
may be held liable, it must, at a
minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site.
Id. (emphasis added).
According to the Mirabile court, the security interest exemption's reference to management of the facility rather than management of the affairs of the actual owner or operator of the facility suggested "that the participation which is critical is participation in
operational, production, or waste disposal activities. Mere financial ability to control waste
disposal practices . . . is not . . . sufficient for the imposition of liability." Id. at 20,995.
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closure indicates that the secured creditor holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest;1 7 and (3) holding
property for four years after foreclosure and during the EPA
cleanup of hazardous wastes indicates that the secured creditor
holds indicia of ownership for investment purposes.13

Guidice also supported the requirement of day-to-day participation in the management of a facility. In 1986, residents of the Borough of Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, commenced an action against BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Company (BFG) for
unlawfully contaminating the environment under CERCLA. BFG filed a third party complaint against current and past owners of adjacent land (the Berlin Property) which included the National Bank of the Commonwealth (the secured creditor). During the
1970's, Berlin Metal Polishers (Berlin) had operated a metal polishing company at the
Berlin Property. In 1971, the secured creditor had approved a line of credit for Berlin
which was secured by assignment of Berlin's accounts receivable. Between 1971 and 1975,
the secured creditor approved several extensions and renewals of this line of credit. Nevertheless, Berlin defaulted on the loan and, in April 1982, the secured creditor
foreclosed on the property. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 558-60.
Considering whether the secured creditor was liable as a potential owner or operator before the foreclosure, the Guidice court stated:
Interpretation of 'participating in the management' and 'primarily to protect
i[t]s security interest' has permitted secured creditors 'to provide financial assistance . . . [in] . . . general, and even isolated instances of specific management
advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor
does not participate in the day-to-day management of the business or facility ....
Id. at 561(quoting United States v. Fleet Factors, Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga.
1988), affld, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), reh denie, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991) (emphasis added).
Since there was no evidence that the secured creditor "controlled operational, production, or waste disposal activities at the Berlin Property," the court held that the secured
creditor was not liable as an owner or operator prior to foreclosure due to the security
interest exemption. Id. at 562. See infra note 138 (discussing liability of the Guidice secured creditor after foreclosure).
137 Mirabile 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996. The secured creditor foreclosed on the
debtor's property and held the property for four months. During those four months, the
secured creditor "secured the building against vandalism by boarding up windows and
changing locks, made inquiries as to the property, and . . . visited the property on various occasions for the purpose of showing it to prospective purchasers." Id. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that these activities fell within the scope of the security interest
exemption because the secured creditor's "actions with respect to the foreclosure were
plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property." Thus, the
secured creditor fulfilled part of the exemption: it held "indicia of ownership" primarily
to protect its security interest. See supra note 136 (discussing why the Mirabile secured
creditor did not participate in the management of the facility so as to void the exemption).
138 Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579. As in Mirabile, the Maryland Bank
Trust court considered whether a secured creditor's activities after foreclosure fell outside
the scope of the security interest exemption. From 1944 through 1980, Herschel and
Nellie McLeod owned property (the CMD site) on which they conducted two businesses
Greater St. Mary's Disposal and Waldorf Sanitation of St. Mary's. During the 1970's
the McLeod's received loans from Maryland Bank and Trust (the secured creditor) which
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United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.'-" was the first federal appellate court case to consider the scope of a secured party's liability
under CERGLA. The EPA brought this action to recover a
$400,000 cleanup of toxic chemicals and asbestos at Swainsboro

were secured by a mortgage on the CMD site. In 1972 and 1973, the McLeod's allowed
hazardous waste disposal on the CMD site, and in 1980 Mark McLeod, the McLeod's son,
purchased the CMD site from his parents with a loan from the secured creditor. When
Mark failed to make payments on the loan, the secured creditor purchased the site at a
foreclosure sale on May 15, 1982. In 1983, the EPA initiated cleanup of the site, incurring approximately $552,000 in cleanup costs. Unlike the secured creditor in Mirabile
however, the secured creditor still held title to the property after the foreclosure sale
and during the EPA cleanup. Id. at 575-76.
In analyzing the issue of the secured creditor's liability as an owner or operator,
the court stressed that the security interest must exist at the time of the cleanup in
order to gain protection under the security interest exemption. Focusing on the fact that
the secured creditor "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to protect its
security interest, but to protect its investment," the court held that only prior to foreclosure did the secured creditor hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security
interest. IT&at 579. Allowing a creditor-turned-owner to claim the security interest exemption would cause:
the federal government alone . . . [to] . . . shoulder the cost of cleaning up
the site, while the former mortgagee-turned-owner, would benefit from the
cleanup by the increased value of the now unpolluted land ....
In essence, th[is] . . . would convert CERCLA into an insurance scheme
for financial institutions, protecting them against possible losses due to the security of loans with polluted properties ....
CERCLA will not absolve them from
responsibility for their mistakes of judgment.
Id. at 580.
According to the court, Congress intended the security interest exemption's indicia of
ownership criteria to address situations in those states where the common law operates so
that mortgagees hold title to the property during the life of the mortgage. Id- at 579.
Nevertheless, "[the exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding title
after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here, the former
mortgagee has held title for nearly four years, and a full year before the EPA cleanup."
Id. Although Maryland Bank & Trust did not address the issue of "participation in management," it did enunciate a broader interpretation than Mirabile of the security interest
exemption's reference to "indicia of ownership" as it pertains to lenders who take title
upon foreclosure.
Likewise, in Guidice the court adopted Maryland Bank & Trust's approach to
whether the security interest exemption applies to a secured creditor after foreclosure. See
supra note 136 (discussing the Guidice secured creditor's liability prior to foreclosure).
According to the Guidice court, Mirabile and Maryland Bank & Trust approached the issue
from different directions: Mirabile asked 'whether a lender is precluded from invoking the
security interest exemption," while Maryland Bank & Trust asked 'whether the exemption
applies in the first place." 732 F. Supp. at 562. The Guidice court held, "When a lender
is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable to the same
extent as any other bidder at the sale would have been." Id. at 563.
139 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), rdi'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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Print Works (SPW), a cloth printing facility.1 40 In 1976, Fleet
Factors Corporation (Fleet) and SPW entered into a factoring
agreement. 141 Pursuant to this agreement, Fleet agreed to advance funds against SPW's accounts receivable, and Fleet obtained
a security interest in SPW's textile facility and all of its equipment,
inventory, and fixtures. 4 Although SPW filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in 1979, the factoring agreement continued with court
approval. 14' Two years later Fleet ceased advancing funds to
SPW, but continued to collect on the accounts receivable assigned
to it under the court-approved factoring agreement.' 44 By the
end of 1981, SPW had been adjudicated bankrupt, and a trustee
assumed title and control of the facility.141 In May 1982, Fleet
foreclosed on its security interest in some of SPW's inventory and
equipment (but not property). Fleet contracted with Baldwin Industrial Liquidators (Baldwin) to conduct an auction where the
items were sold "as is" and "in place." The purchasers of the items
were responsible for their removal. 46 Baldwin allegedly removed
fifty-five gallon drums of toxic chemicals away from the sales area
before the auction. Additionally, the purchasers at the auction
allegedly disturbed asbestos that was on the pipes connected to
147
the equipment and machinery.
Approximately three months later, Fleet contracted with Nix
Riggers to remove the unsold equipment from the facility, and by
the end of 1983, Nix vacated the premises. 14 Before vacating
the premises, however, Nix allegedly disturbed asbestos in the
149
same manner as the purchasers at the auction.

140

Id. at 1553.

141 A factoring agreement' is typically "a sale of accounts receivable to another party
at a discount. The purchasing party assumes the risk of loss from the receivables. This
type of agreement envisions that the purchasing party will be substantially involved in the
financial affairs of the seller of the receivables." Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard,

Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Sorting Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAIL. REV. 1187, 1195
n.35 (1991).
142 901 F.2d at 1552.
143 Id.
144 Id. Fleet ceased advancing funds because SPW's debt exceeded Fleet's estimate of
the value of SPW's accounts receivable. Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1552-53. The auction took place on June 22, 1982.
147 Id. at 1560 n.14.
148 Id. at 1553. Nix Riggers was instructed to leave the premises "broom clean." At
deposition, Nix testified that he "understood that he had been given a 'free hand' by
Fleet or Baldwin to do whatever was necessary at the facility to remove the machinery

and equipment." Id.
149 Id. at 1560 n.14.
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An EPA inspection of the facility after a fire in early 1983
revealed 700 fifty-five gallon drums of toxic chemicals and fortyfour truckloads of asbestos materials.15 On July 9, 1987, two days
after Emanuel County, Georgia, gained title to the facility through
a foreclosure sale, the EPA brought this action against Fleet to
recover the $400,000 cost of the hazardous waste cleanup.'-'
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of Fleet's motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh
Circuit considered Fleet's liability under both present owner or
operator status (§ 9607(a)(1)), and owner or operator status at
the time of disposal (§ 9607(a)(2)). While the Court of Appeals
dismissed Fleet's possible liability under § 9607(a) (1),152 it held
that § 9607(a)(2) provided a basis for liability. Under §
9607(a)(2), Fleet could be held liable either if it operated the
facility within the meaning of § 9607(a) (2), or if it held indicia of
ownership and participated in the management of the facility to a
degree which would eliminate the security interest exemption.
Although Fleet could be held liable under either theory, the
Court of Appeals only considered Fleet's potential liability under
the latter analysis - that is, the secured creditor analysis. 5 '
Accepting as undisputed the fact that Fleet held an "indicia of
ownership" in the SPW facility primarily to protect its security interest,15 4 the Court of Appeals focused on "whether Fleet participated in management sufficiently to incur liability under the statute."'5 5 The dispositive question for the court was not whether

150 Id. at 1553.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1554-55. At the time the litigation commenced, Emanuel County, Georgia,
was the owner of the SPW facility. CERCLA provides, however, that if a state or local
government involuntarily acquires title to a facility, one must look to the "person who
owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand" in order to determine the person who has current owner or operator status under
§ 9607(a)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii). Since the bankrupt estate and trustee of SPW
were the owners of the facility "immediately beforehand," Fleet could not be held liable
under § 9607(a)(1). Fleet's involvement with the facility terminated more than three
years before the county assumed ownership. 901 F.2d at 1555.
153 Id. at 1556 n.6. "In order to avoid repetition, and because this case fits more
snugly under a secured creditor analysis, we will forgo an analysis of Fleet's liability as an
operator." Id.
154 Id. at 1556.
155 Id. The EPA argued that the security interest exemption should be narrowly interpreted so that "any secured creditor that participates in any manner in the management
of a facility," would be excluded from the protection of the security interest exemption.
Id. at 1556' The court rejected the government's interpretation because "it would largely
eviscerate the exemption Congress intended to afford to secured creditors." Id. The court
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the secured creditor acted with the purpose of protecting its security interest, but rather, what was the character and scope of the
secured creditor's involvement with the facility. Enunciating its
standard for holding secured creditors liable as owners under §
9607(a) (2), the court stated:
[A] secured creditor may incur ..
liability, without being an
operator, by participatingin the financial manqgement of a facility
to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable ....
Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in management
decisions relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the
facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose."5

stated:
Secured lenders frequently have some involvement in the financial affairs of
their debtors in order to insure that their interests are being adequately protected. To adopt the government's interpretation of the secured creditor exemption could expose all such lenders to CERCLA liability for engaging in their
normal course of business.
Id
On the other hand, Fleet urged the court to "adopt the distinction delineated by
some district courts [including the court below and Mirabile] between permissible participation in the financial management of the facility and impermissible participation in the
day-to-day or operational management of a facility." Id. (emphasis added). As with the EPA's
interpretation, however, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Fleet's interpretation:
In order to achieve the "overwhelmingly remedial" goal of the CERCLA statutory
scheme, ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability for the
costs incurred by the government in responding to the hazards at such facilities ....
[A] broad interpretation of the exemption would essentially require a
secured creditor to be involved in the operations of a facility in order to incur
liability. This construction ignores the plain language of the exemption and
essentially renders it meaningless. Individuals and entities involved in the operations of a facility are already liable as operators under the express language of
section 9607(a)(2). Had Congress intended to absolve secured creditors from
ownership liability, it would have done so. Instead, the statutory language chosen
by Congress explicitly holds secured creditors liable if they participate in the
management of a facility.
Id at 1557.
156 Id at 1557-58 (emphasis added). Commentators argue that this language is dicta
since the court did not have to enunciate such a broad standard in order to deny Fleet's
motion for summary judgment.
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Applying this standard to Fleet's alleged involvement with SPW,
the court found that Fleet was removed from the protection of
the secured creditor exemption.5 7
The Court of Appeals divided Fleet's involvement with the
borrower into three stages of activity: (1) 1976 until SPW ceased
printing operations in early 1981, (2) early 1981 until the auction,
and (3) after the auction. 5 The court found Fleet's second and
third stage activities impermissible under CERCLA' 59 During the
second stage, Fleet participated in the financial management of
SPW to a degree indicating a capacity to influence hazardous
waste decisions through the following alleged activities: (1) requiring SPW to seek Fleet's approval before shipping goods, (2) establishing the price for excess inventory, (3) dictating who should
receive finished goods and when they should receive them, (4)
deciding when to fire employees, (5) supervising the activity of
SPW's office administrator, (6) controlling access to the facility,
(7) receiving and processing SPW's employment and tax forms,
and (8) contracting with Baldwin to conduct the auction."6 Additionally, during the third stage Fleet's activities were impermissible under CERCLA's security interest exemption.'61
Hill v. East Asiatic Co. 112 is the only decision since Fleet Fac6
tors" to address the question of whether a lender is relieved
from cleanup cost liability under CERCLA's security interest exemption. This case involved a complex set of financial arrangements among Bergsoe Metal Corporation (Bergsoe), the Port of
St. Helens (the Port), the United States National Bank of Oregon
(the Bank), and the EAC corporations (EAC).'" The Port, a

157
158

Id. at 1559-60.
Id.

159

The court held that Fleet's activities during the first stage (advancing funds, pay-

ing and arranging security deposits for SPW's utility services, and ceasing funds when
SPWs debt exceeded the value of the accounts receivable) were within the scope of the
security interest exemption. Id. at 1559.

160
161

IdId. at 1560. Fleet's activities during this stage also indicated CERCLA operator

status.

162 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
163 While no subsequent court decisions have been rendered addressing the concept
of lender control under CERCLA's security interest exemption, cases have been filed and
are pending in courts regarding this issue. See, e.g., Howard and Gerard, supra note 141,
at 1199-1200 n.57.
164 910 F.2d at 669. Bergsoe's stock was owned by the EAC corporations which were
the East Asiatic Company, Incorporated, the East Asiatic Company, Limited, and Heidelberg Eastern, Incorporated.
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municipal corporation authorized to issue revenue bonds to promote industrial development in the St. Helens, Oregon area, financed Bergsoe's construction of a lead recycling plant through
revenue bonds and leased Bergsoe the property on which the
plant was built. 5 The Port mortgaged the property and lead recycling plant to the Bank as trustee for the bondholders. The
Bank not only acted as trustee, but also purchased the bonds from
the Port, who, in partial consideration, subordinated all its rights
and revenues under the leases to the Bank." Therefore Bergsoe
paid rent directly to the Bank. 6 7 Through these financial transactions, the Port gained the status of a secured creditor.'6 When
the plant experienced financial difficulties, the Bank and the Port
agreed not to foreclose on Bergsoe, and instead, appointed Front
Street Management Corporation (Front Street) to manage the
plant. 9 Nevertheless, the plant did not resolve its financial situation, and, on October 21, 1986, the Bank forced Bergsoe into
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 7 By this time, it was discovered that the
plant had been171contaminated with hazardous substances and this
action resulted.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Port's
activities fell outside the scope of the security interest exemption.
EAC claimed that the Port's activities constituted participation in
management because the Port negotiated and encouraged the
construction of the plant, decided to appoint Front Street to manage the plant, and held rights of inspection and reentry upon
foreclosure. 72 While the Ninth Circuit recognized the Fleet Factors standard, it stated, "It is clear from the statute that, whatever
165

I& at 669-70.

166 Id. at 670.
167 Id. Additionally, the Port placed documents pertaining to the transactions in escrow with the Bank, with instructions to deliver the documents to Bergsoe if it exercised

its option to purchase the facility. Id.
168 The court recognized that "the Port held title to the property not to ensure that
it would receive payment [as in the case of most secured creditors], but to guarantee
that Bergsoe would cover the Port's own indebtedness under the bonds." Id. at 671. The
court concluded, however, that this difference does not change the analysis involved
when determining whether the Port falls under CERCLA's security interest exemption. Id
169 Id. at 670.

170

Id.

171 The Bank and the trustee in bankruptcy requested that EAC be held liable for
the costs of the hazardous waste cleanup. EAC filed a counterclaim, which included a
third-party complaint against the Port. The Port moved for summary judgment which was
granted by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court. EAC appealed this

ruling to the Court of Appeals. Id
172 Id. at 672-78.
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the precise parameters of 'participation,' there must be some actual
management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exemption." i"' Analyzing the Port's involvement, the
Ninth Circuit found that the Port had not participated in the
management of the plant: "That a secured creditor reserves certain rights to protect its investment does not put it in a position
of management. What is critical is not what rights the Port had,
but what it did." 74 According to the court, the Port did not participate in the plant's management and, thus, was not an "owner
or operator" under CERCLA due to the security interest exemp175
tion.
The Ninth Circuit enunciated a different standard of participation required to void the security interest exemption. The Ninth
Circuit required participation in the form of actual management,
while the Eleventh Circuit required participation in financial management indicating a capacity to influence hazardous waste decisions. Therefore, due to the split in the circuits, which interpretation is correct - in other words, which interpretation is in congruence with the common law? The answer is that both the Ninth
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit reached the correct result, but
neither used the correct analysis. Both circuits failed to refer to
common-law principles of lender liability (agency and instrumentality) which offer insight into the allowable degree of a lender's
control.
Fleet Factors involved a secured creditor whose conduct, from
the time it ceased advancing funds in 1981 until Nix vacated the
premises, constituted de facto control under the typical agency
analysis. As did the secured creditor in Cargil the secured creditor in Fleet Factors was involved in the winding down operations of
its debtor to such an extent that it controlled the manner and
cost of the debtor's sales of goods, as well as the internal operation and financial management of the debtor. Additionally, the
secured creditor had the right of entry onto the debtor's premises
(and exercised this right), as did the secured creditor in CargilL
Therefore, the required degree of control under the agency theory was present through the Fleet Factors secured creditor's alleged

173

Id. at 672.

174 Id.
175 The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments due to a lack of facts, and because
nearly all secured creditors have these rights and are in these positions. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit stressed the need for actual participation. Id. at 672-73.
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activities. The hazardous waste contamination occurred within the
bounds of this control, or within .the scope of the debtor's employment, since the hazardous waste contamination resulted from
activities authorized by the secured creditor. 176 Additionally, the
secured creditor's involvement during the auction and subsequently constituted actual, total, participatory control as required by the
instrumentality theory. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reached the
correct result, because the secured creditor's activities caused it to
lose the protection of the security interest exemption due to its
amount of control.
The court's reasoning in Fleet Factors, however, is flawed. The
court stressed that financial management to a degree indicating a
mere capacity to influence hazardous waste decisions could remove
a secured creditor from the security interest exemption. Compared
to both common-law principles of agency and instrumentality, this
standard is much too broad. Both theories require a much higher
degree of control by the secured creditor. The instrumentality
theory requires actual, participatory, total control which is not
present in a mere capacity to influence. The agency theory allows
the degree of control to be present through a right to control,
but this right must be more than a mere capacity to influence. It
must be an actual right to de facto control - a higher standard
than the mere capacity to influence hazardous waste decisions.
Additionally, this right to de facto control must extend either
explicitly or implicitly to the tortious conduct of the debtor. Thus,
due to the agency theory's requirement that the debtor's tortious
conduct was within the scope of employment, the secured
creditor's de facto control must encompass the debtor's hazardous
waste decisions - not merely influence these decisions, but actually authorize (explicitly or implicitly) these decisions.
In Hill v. East Asiatic Co. the Ninth Circuit also reached the
correct result. The secured creditor's activities did not constitute
control under either the agency or instrumentality theory. Although the secured creditor appointed a third party to manage
the debtor, negotiated and encouraged the construction of the
debtor's plant, and had the right of entry after foreclosure, the
agency theory requires that the secured creditor's activities be ex-

176 The secured creditor in Fleet Factors allegedly prohibited the debtor from selling
several barrels of chemicals to potential buyers, and as a result, the barrels remained at
the facility. 901 F.2d at 1559 n.13. Additionally, through the activities of third parties
(Nix, Baldwin, and the purchasers at the auction), the secured creditor authorized the
alleged activities which caused the hazardous waste contamination. Id. at 1560 n.14.
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amined as a whole. As a whole, the secured creditor's activities
were simply too minimal to constitute de facto control. In essence,
the secured creditor assigned any involvement it would have with
the debtor to a third party (the Bank), and remained involved
only .on paper. Additionally, the secured creditor's activities did
not even approach the standard of control required by the instrumentality theory. Therefore, like the Ninth Circuit's result, neither
agency nor instrumentality would have found the secured creditor
liable for the debtor's tortious conduct. Again, however, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit disregarded a creditor's rights as having any influence over whether it
falls outside the security interest exemption. While the instrumentality theory requires actual participation by the creditor, the agency theory allows a creditor's right to de facto control to meet the
requisite degree of control under this common-law theory so long
as the right to control encompasses the debtor's scope of employment.
Both decisions are flawed in that neither used common-law
principles to reach its decision. The agency and instrumentality
theories should- both be used to interpret CERCLA's security interest exemption. 17 7 These decisions are also flawed because both
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits examined each element of the
security interest exemption separately. This is inappropriate because a secured creditor will no longer hold indicia of ownership
primarily to protect its security interest when an agency or instrumentality relationship is established. Nevertheless, the existence of
both an agency and instrumentality relationship is determined by
the amount of control exerted over the debtor - i.e., the degree
of participation in management.'7" Therefore, both circuits ignored the reality that the factors indicative of participation in
management are also indicative of whether a secured creditor held
indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest.
B.

The Environmental Protection Agency

In 1990, the EPA construed the allowable activities under the
security interest exemption in a very narrow manner. In its brief
before the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors, the EPA stated:

177
178

See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying infra notes 211-15.
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[The secured creditor] exemption is available only to those
who do not participate in management of the facility, not those
who participate in management for limited purposes, such as
[R]ead for its
in order to protect their security interest ....
plain meaning, CERCLA's phrase 'without participating' cannot
be twisted to mean 'while participating only for limited purposes.'
A test requiring participating in day-to-day management
comes near to holding secured creditors liable only when their
involvement would suffice to hold them independently liable as
operators. This is unjustified, given their underlying status as
owners. By waiting to foreclose until after a government funded
cleanup was completed, they could unjustly benefit from the
improvement in the property value. Isolated instances of making or sharing management decisions, especially when those
decisions directly affect the release or disposal
of hazardous
179
substances, should suffice to attach liability.
Then a year later the EPA radically changed its view of the security interest exemption.
On June 24, 1991, the EPA proposed a rule ("proposed
rule")'
to clarify the meaning of CERCLA's security interest exemption, 8 1 and requested comments on this rule. Almost one
year later, and after receiving over 350 comments on the proposed
rule, the EPA issued its final rule ("final rule") on April 24,
1992.12 With the final rule, the EPA adopted a hands-off policy
179 Brief for Appellee at 40-41, United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th
Cir.)(No. 89-8094), rehk denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denie, 111 S. Ct. 752
(1991), quoted in, Howard and Gerard, supra note 141, at 1202. See p.63 n.6. For the
Eleventh Circuit's response to this argument, see supra note 155.
180 56 Fed. Reg. 28798 (1991)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 24,
1991).
181 This rule also interprets CERCLA's § 101(35) (A) (ii) pertaining to "the ownership
status under CERCLA of government entities that acquire contaminated facilities through
escheat, eminent domain, involuntary transfer or acquisition, and other means . . . ." 56

Fed. Reg. 28798, 28798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 24,
1991). Under this section, a governmental lending entity, receiver, or conservator may be
entitled to assert the "innocent landowner defense" if it involuntarily acquired a contaminated facility. See supra note 12. The EPA includes within the scope of this section "the
acquisition of facilities by governmental entities through an involuntary transfer under
statutes requiring the acquisition of property in which the governmental entity holds a
security interest or has acted as a loan guarantor, conservator, or receiver, provided that
the other elements of the defense are met." Id. Additionally, the EPA includes within the
scope of this section other mechanisms of obtaining property, such as civil and criminal
seizures and asset forfeitures. See id. at 28806-08.
Further analysis of this section of the EPA's proposed rule is beyond the scope of
this Note.
182 57 Fed. Reg. (1992)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. subpt. L)(issued April 24,
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by leaving lenders' problems under CERCLA up to market determinations.' As did the proposed rule, the final rule interprets §
9601(20) (A) as permitting "a person covered by the exemption to
undertake a broad range of activity in the course of protecting a
security interest in a facility that is subject to CERCLA, without
being considered
to be participating in the management of the
84
facility."'
With the rule, the EPA attempts to define the three elements
of the security interest exemption: "indicia of ownership," "primarily to protect [the] security interest," and "participating in the
management." "Indicia of ownership" is defined as "evidence of
interests in real or personal property."18 5 The finalrule explicitly

1992) (unpublished rule on file with the Environmental Protection Agency). At the time
that this Note was sent to the printer, the final rule had not yet been published in the
Federal Register. The final rule will become effective once it is published. Id. (unpublished rule at 2).
One of the major differences between the proposed rule and the final rule is the
final rule's discussion of the coverage of trustees and fiduciaries. While the EPA does not
extend the security interest exemption to trustees, it stresses that this is not necessary:
The assumption of several commenters - that a trustee is personally liable
under CERCLA solely because a trust asset is contaminated even if the trustee
had no knowledge of the asset's contamination and was in no way involved in
the activities that resulted in the contamination - is incorrect. No case has so
held, and no commenter cited any principle of law that would command this
result.
Id. (unpublished rule at 24).
Unlike the proposed rule, the final rule also addresses the application of this rule
on CERCLA's security interest exemption to other federal and state laws. The EPA states
that it has begun to work on a proposed rule which would interpret the security interest
Exemption of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §
6991(h)(9) in a manner similar to the final rule's interpretation of CERCLA's security
interest exemption. Nevertheless, the EPA explains that "this final rule does not preempt
a holder's potential liability under any other state or federal law to which the holder is
also subject, nor can it be construed to subordinate CERCLA to other state or federal
laws." 57 Fed. Reg. (unpublished rule at 27).
Other differences and similarities are explained in part III of the final rule, and
include other topics such as the general test of participation in management, see infra
notes 200-03 and accompanying text, and the consistent application of the exemption to
different types of property, 57 Fed. Reg. (unpublished rule at 44-45).
183 Leaving a lender's cost for investing in a environmentally unsound debtor up to
the market does not eliminate the lender liability problem; rather, it shifts enforcement
of lender liability from the EPA to the market.
184 57 Fed. Reg. (unpublished rule at 11).
185 Id. (unpublished rule at 133). According to the EPA, examples of "indicia of
ownership" include "a mortgage, deed of trust, or legal or equitable title obtained pursuant to foreclosure or its equivalents, a surety bond, guarantee of an obligation, title held
pursuant to a lease financing transaction in which the lessor does not select initially the
leased property, or an assignment, lien, pledge, or other right to or form of encum-
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recognizes that "[t]here is no limitation or qualification on the
type, quality, or quantity of ownership indicia... provided that
the indicia are held primarily as protection for a security interest .... "186 Therefore, a person need not "hold actual title or a

security interest" in order to hold indicia of ownership within the
meaning of the security interest exemption.8 7
The EPA's definition of "primarily to protect [the] security
interest" distinguishes between a bona fide security interest' and
interests in the nature of an investment in the facility. This definition requires "that the ownership interest be maintained primarily
for the purpose of, or primarily in connection with, securing payment or performance of a loan or other obligation (a security
interest), and not an interest in property held for some other
reason.""8 9 Therefore, under the security interest exemption,
"indicia of ownership" held "primarily to protect [a] security interest" does not include "interests in the nature of an investment in
the facility, or an ownership interest held primarily for any reason
other than as protection for a security interest." 9 ' Nevertheless,
revenue interests in the loan transactions that create security interests are not considered investment interests.19 1 Therefore, acbrance against property." Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. This definition includes types of ownership interests other than actual title or
a security interest because comments on the proposed rule questioned the scope of the
definition of "security interest" Id. (unpublished rule at 32). As a result, the EPA chose
to include within the definition of holders of security interests (in addition to the holders of traditional security interests in real property, i.e., mortgages, liens, and deeds of
trust) persons involved in lease financing transactions, and "other persons involved in
ensuring the free flow of credit and in providing for needed financing. . . ," such as
loan guarantors and sureties. Id. (unpublished rule at 37).
188 The EPA defines a security interest as arising from "a transaction that . . . provides the holder with recourse against real or personal property of the person pledging
the security;, the purpose of the interest is to secure the repayment of money, the performance of a duty, or of some other obligation." Id.(unpublished rule at 134). Examples
of a security interest include "mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and title held pursuant to
lease financing transactions." Id. (unpublished rule at 135). Additionally, "[slecurity interests may also arise from transactions such as sale-and-leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales, trust receipt transactions, certain assignments, factoring agreements or ac" Id
counts receivable financing agreements, [and] consignments ....
189 I. (unpublished rule at 134) (emphasis added).
190 Id. (unpublished rule at 135). This is the only element of the security interest
exemption which considers the motivation of the secured creditor. While protection of a
security interest need not be the sole motivation, and a secured creditor may be motivated by secondary reasons, the secured creditor's possession of indicia of ownership must
be primarily motivated by the desire to protect a security interest. Id. (unpublished rule at
47).
191 I (unpublished rule at 136).
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cording to the EPA, a creditor holding indicia of ownership primarily for investment purposes cannot gain protection from the
security interest exemption; rather, only creditors holding indicia
of ownership primarily to protect their security interest - in other
words, to secure repayment for their loan - fall within the security interest exemption's scope.
The most controversial of the EPA's definitions is the meaning the EPA places on "participating in the management of a
facility." Before discussing this definition, the EPA concedes that
the issue of whether a secured creditor participated in the management is a fact-sensitive inquiry.192 Nevertheless, the EPA goes
on to define this fact-sensitive term as "actual participation in the
management or operation of the facility by the holder [of the
indicia of ownership primarily to protect the security interest],
[which] does not include the mere capacity or unexercised right
or ability to influence facility operations."19 The EPA gives examples of activities"' commonly taken by a secured creditor considered "consistent with holding ownership indicia primarily to
protect a security interest."19 5 These activities, which do not constitute participation in the management of the debtor's facility,
include: (1) undertaking actions at the inception of a security
interest,196 (2) policing the security interest or loan, 197 (3) con-

192 Id (unpublished rule at 137).
193 I&
194 The EPA's list of permitted activities is devised from ,case law and comments on
the proposed rule. Id. (unpublished rule at 138).
195 Id.
196 Id.(unpublished rule at 141-43). Actions undertaken prior to or at the inception
of a transaction are not considered participation in management. because absent indicia
of ownership (which is not present at the time of these activities), the security interest
exemption does not apply. Therefore, the following activities do not constitute participation in management:
consultation and negotiation concerning the structure and terms of the loan or
other obligation, the payment of interest, the payment period, and specific or
general financial or other advice, suggestions, counseling, guidance, or other actions incident or prior to time that indicia of ownership are held to protect a
security interest ....
Z& (unpublished rule at 141).
Additionally, a secured creditor may require an environmental inspection of a facility as a condition to the debtor's ability to secure the loan. If such an inspection occurs,
it cannot be used to show that the secured creditor participated in the management of
the facility. Id. (unpublished rule at 142). If such an inspection reveals contaminated
property, however, the secured creditor has many options, including requiring the debtor
to conduct a cleanup, and extending the security interest even though the property is
contaminated. The EPA stresses that a secured creditor that "knowingly takes a security
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ducting loan workouts, 9 and (4) foreclosing and selling or liquidating.'
Nevertheless, even if the secured creditor's activities

interest in a contaminated facility is not subject to CERCLA liability solely on this basis."
Id. (unpublished rule at 143).
197 Id. (unpublished rule at 143-44) Examples of a secured creditor's allowable policing of a security interest or loan include, but are not limited to:
[1] a requirement that the borrower clean up the facility prior to or during the
life of the loan or security interest; [2] a requirement of assurance of the
borrower's compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental or
other rules and regulations during the life of the loan or security interest; [3]
securing authority or permission for the security holder to periodically or regularly monitor or inspect the facility in which the holder possesses indicia of ownership (including site inspections), or the borrower's business or financial condition, or both; [4] or to comply with legal requirements to which the holder is
subject; or [5] other requirements or conditions by which the holder is able to
police adequately the loan or security interest, provided that the exercise by the
holder of such other loan policing activities are not considered evidence of
management participation as provided in the rule's 'general test' of management
participation.
Id. (unpublished rule at 143).
Additionally, the "inclusion of environmental warranties and covenants are not considered
to be evidence of a holder acting as an insurer or guarantor, and liability cannot be
premised on the existence of such terms . . . ." Id. (unpublished rule at 144).
198 Id. (unpublished rule at 144-45). "Loan workout" activities are not considered
participation in the management as long as the secured creditor complies with the general test of management participation. Id. (unpublished rule at 145). The EPA specifies
some loan workout activities that comply with this test. These activities which are not
considered participation in management include, but are not limited to:
[1] restructuring or renegotiating the terms of the security interest, [2] requiring payment of additional rent or interest, [3] exercising forbearance; [4] requiring or exercising rights pursuant to an assignment of accounts or other
amounts owing to an obligor, [6] requiring or exercising rights pursuant to an
escrow agreement pertaining to amounts owing to an obligor; [61 providing specific or general financial or other advice, suggestions, counseling, or guidance;
[7] and exercising any right or remedy the holder is entitled to by law or under any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or promises from the
borrower.
Id.
199 Id. (unpublished rule at 145-53). According to the rule, the following activities are
within the security interest exemption's requirement that the indicia of ownership must
be held primarily to protect the security interest:
foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale, acquisition or assignment of title in lieu
of foreclosure, repossession in the case of a lease financing transaction, acquisition of a right to possession or title, or other agreement in settlement of the
loan obligation, or any other formal or informal manner by which the holder
acquires possession of the borrower's collateral for subsequent disposition in
partial or full satisfaction of the underlying obligation . . ..
Id. (unpublished rule at 146).
Nevertheless, such activities will be protected only if the acquisition pursuant to foreclosure is temporary and the secured creditor is seeking to sell of otherwise divest the prop-
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are not included in one of the foregoing specified categories of
activities, the security interest exemption may still be available to
the secured creditor if its activities pass the two-pronged general
2°
test of participation in the management of a facility.

erty. Id. Therefore, "a holder must be acting consistently with the exemption's requirement that the ownership indicia maintained by the holder continue to be held primarily
to protect the security interest." Id. (unpublished rule at 146-47).
The EPA sets forth a general rule stating that "a foreclosing holder must seek to
sell ...
in a reasonably expeditious manner using whatever commercially reasonable
means are available or appropriate, taking all facts and circumstances into account." Id

(unpublished rule at 147). Therefore, a secured creditor cannot "reject or refuse offers
for the property that represent fair consideration for the asset." Id. If a secured creditor

does reject such an offer, it will no longer be considered as holding indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest. Id.
Under this rule, "fair consideration" means "all cash offer[s]." Nevertheless, "the
amount that will recover the holder's 'security interest' in the property may vary depending on the seniority of the loan or other obligation that is being foreclosed upon." Id.
(unpublished rule at 149). Therefore, a senior creditor may be required to accept a cash
amount representing "a value equal to or greater than the outstanding obligation," while
a junior creditor "may be required to outbid senior creditors in order to recover the
value of its loan or other obligation." Id. (unpublished rule at 148-49).
Although the secured creditor may use all reasonable and appropriate means for
marketing the property for sale in an expeditious manner, the EPA establishes a bright
line test for such disposition, if the secured creditor so chooses to use the testa holder choosing to avail itself of this bright line test must, within twelve
months following the acquisition of marketable title, list the property with a
broker, dealer, or agent who deals with the type of property in question, or advertise the property as being for sale or disposition on at least a monthly basis
in either a real estate publication or a trade or other publication suitable for
the property in question, or a newspaper of general circulation . . . covering the
area where the property is located. If the holder satisfies these criteria, the holder is considered to have complied with the requirement that it is seeking to sell
or otherwise divest the property in an expeditious manner.
Id. (unpublished rule at 150).
While the rule does not impose a time requirement for the ultimate disposition of
foreclosed-on property, the exemption will be voided "if at any time after six months following the acquisition of marketable title the holder rejects, or does not act upon within
90 days of receipt of, a written, bona f&4 firm offer of fair consideration for the property ... ." Id. (unpublished rule at 151). A written, bona fid, firm offer is defined as "a
legally enforceable, commercially reasonable, offer, including all material terms of the
transaction, from a ready, willing, and able purchaser who demonstrates to the holder's
satisfaction the ability to perform." Id.
The EPA rule also provides that the secured creditor may also "undertake actions
with respect to the facility to protect or preserve the value of the secured asset." I&

Additionally, the secured creditor may wind up the facility's operations, id. (unpublished
rule at 152), and even maintain the business operations of the property. Id. (unpublished
rule at 153).
200 The proposed rule's general test stated that a secured creditor will be considered
to be participating in the management is, while the debtor is still in possession, either.
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The intent of this final rule's general test "is to protect 'lenders from being exposed to CERCLA liability for engaging in their
normal course of business,' while imposing liability where a holder
moves from oversight and advice to instances of actual facility
management."20 1 The first prong of the test provides that a secured creditor "participates in management where [it] has exercised decisionmaking control over the borrower's environmental
compliance (i.e., the borrower's hazardous substance disposal or
handling practices) .... It is not necessary for a holder to cause

a release in order to be exercising control over a facility's hazardous waste disposal or handling practices."202 The second prong
of the test provides that a secured creditor "participates in management when it assumes or manifests responsibility for the overall
management of the enterprise encompassing the day-to-day
decisionmaking over either (a) the enterprise's environmental compliance or (b) all, or substantially all, of the operational aspects of
the enterprise other than environmental compliance."2 M3 Therefore, if
a secured creditor participates in the management under either
prong of the final rule's general test, the security interest exemption no longer applies.

(1) The security holder is exercising decisionmaking control over the borrower's
environmental compliance, such that the security holder has undertaken responsibility for the borrower's waste disposal or hazardous substance handling practices which results in a release or threatened release, or (2) the security holder is
exercising control at a management level encompassing the borrower's environmental compliance responsibilities, comparable to that of a manager of the
borrower's enterprise, such that the security holder has assumed or manifested
responsibility for the management of the enterprise by establishing, implementing, or maintaining the policies and procedures encompassing the day to day
environmental compliance decisionmaking of the enterprise.
56 Fed. Reg. 28798, 28803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 24,
1991).
The final rule changek this general test. somewhat, largely due to "comments that
the proposed rule's general test permitted activities that courts construing the exemption
had prohibited . . . ." 57 Fed. Reg. (unpublished rule at 65).

201 57 Fed. Reg. (unpublished rule at 67). Additionally, the EPA believes that the
general test should "reflect the distinction between the control exercised by a person who
is exercising decisionmaking authority over the operational aspects of the facility, and the
influence that may be exerted (no matter how great) over the borrower by a person who
is not part of the facility's decisionmaking hierarchy." Id. (unpublished rule at 68).
202 Id. (unpublished rule at 69).
203 Id. (unpublished rule at 72). "A holder's involvement in financial or administrative matters does not rise to a level of management participation that will void the exemption because involvement in such areas does not assume the functions of facility
operations . . . ." Id. (unpublished rule at 72-73).
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The EPA rule is part of the National Contingency Plan
(NCP). Under § 9605(a) of CERCLA, the EPA204 is empowered
to publish the NCP "to reflect and effectuate the responsibilities
and powers created by [CERCLA]. "2°5 Although the EPA rule
enunciates a narrower interpretation of control than the commonlaw principles of lender liability,206 it most likely will withstand
judicial scrutiny. 0 7 While courts must resort to the common law
when interpreting statutes, the EPA's published standards for the
20 8
NCP need only be within the agency's authority and reasonable.

204 This section actually refers to the President, but in practice it is the EPA that
publishes the NCP. Under § 9615, the President "is authorized to delegate and assign
any duties or powers imposed upon or assigned to him and to promulgate any regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 9615. See supra
note 3.
205 Id § 9605(a). This section reads, in part[The NCP] shall establish procedures and standards for responding to releases
of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants, which shall include at a
minimum: . . .

(3) methods and criteria for determining the appropriate extent of removal, remedy, and other measures authorized by this chapter; . . .
(9) specified roles for private organizations and entities in preparation for
response and in responding to releases of hazardous substances, including identification of appropriate qualifications and capacity therefor ....
The President [EPA] may, from time to time, revise and republish the
national contingency plan.
Id.
206 The EPA's definition of "participation in management" does not appear to comply with common-law principles of lender liability. To be held liable under the rule while
a debtor is still in possession, a creditor must decide aspects of the debtor's environmental compliance either explicitly or through its overall management control. For example,
a creditor may regularly monitor or inspect a debtor's facility, business and financial
condition; advise the debtor both on its finances and operations; and hold property after
foreclosure for at least six months. While these activities may be within the scope of
control permitted under the instrumentality theory, such activities have been found outside the allowable scope of control under the agency theory. See supra part II C. Additionally, other activities found outside the scope of the requisite degree of control under
agency may be found where the EPA states that the creditor may take any other reasonably necessary steps to police the loan, and provide loan workouts. These bright-line rules
defining "participation in management" are not in accordance with the common law.
207 In order to obtain judicial review of this rule, an interested person must apply to
the District of Columbia Circuit within ninety days after the rule is promulgated. Id. §
9613(a). Another way in which the final rule could possibly be reversed is through a
legislative veto. 57 Fed. Reg. (1992)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. subpt. L)(issued April 24,
1992) (unpublished rule on file with the EPA, at 3.)
208 Although commentators have argued that the EPA rule is outside the scope of its
authority under CERCLA since it promulgates standards distinguishing who will face liability and who will not, the recent trend of courts leans towards giving deference to agency
decisions. While the degree ofjudicial review will depend on the type of rule and other
factors which are outside the scope of this Note, it appears unlikely from the recent
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Therefore, assuming that the rule withstands judicial review,
the EPA must comply with the final rule's standards when deciding whether to seek reimbursement for response costs from lenders. This does not, however, end the issue of lender liability under
CERCLA. There still remains the question of whether this rule
applies to third parties seeking contribution under CERCLA, or
private parties suing lenders under CERCLA. In other words, when
third parties or private parties bring suit against lenders for
CERCLA liability, do courts have to use the EPA rule to interpret
the security interest exemption?
Although many commentators suggest that it is questionable
whether the EPA rule applies to third parties and private parties,2" § 9607(a) (B) appears to require that all such actions be
consistent with the NCP. 210 Therefore, assuming that third parties and private parties can only bring actions under CERCLA
consistent with the NCP, how do the common-law principles of
lender liability come into play for courts interpreting whether a
lender's activities fall within the scope of CERCLA's security interest exemption? Does not the EPA rule negate the necessity of
resorting to common-law principles for interpreting the security interest exemption?

trend that the EPA rule on lender liability will be overturned by a court. See, eg., 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988) (Agency decisions will only be set aside by courts if the decisions are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S.
116, 125 (1985) (Since the view of the agency charged with administering the statute is
entitled to considerable deference, a court does not have to find that it is the only permissible construction which the agency might have adopted, but, rather, only that the
agency's understanding of the statute is sufficiently rational to preclude a court from
substituting its judgment for that of the agency.); Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. ,Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (upheld EPA regulations on air
pollution as a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion). See generally KENNETH C.
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW OF THE SEVENnEs §§ 29.01-1 to 29.01-5 (1976).
209 See, e.g., Howard and Gerard, supra note 141, at 1209; CERCA Challenges Lauyers,
supra note 181, at 2414 (quoting Patricia Lynne Truscelli, Partner at Parker Chapin
Flattau & Klimpl); EPA Official Says Secured Lenders Should Look Ahead To Third-Party Actions, [Regulation, Economics and Law] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 158, at
A-8 (Aug. 15., 1991) (quoting William White, EPA's Enforcement Counsel for Superfund);
Witnesses Tell House Banking Panel Legislation Needed to Clarify CERCLA, [Regulation, Economics and Law] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 133, at A-9 (July 11, 1991)
(quoting David Ballweg, Independent Bankers Association of American President; and
James Nelson, Mortgage Bankers Association of America President).
210 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(B). See 57 Fed. Reg. (1992)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
subpt. L)(issued April 24, 1992) (unpublished rule on file with the EPA, at 106-09) (discussing why the final rule is binding on third party and private party suits).
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The answer is no for two reasons. First, the EPA final rule
does not define every specific activity allowed by a lender -under
CERCLA. When a specific fact situation left unclear by the final
rule comes before a court, the court must use the general test of
participation in management to determine if the secured creditor's
particular activities fall outside the scope of the security interest
exemption. This general test is, however, just that - a general test
open to interpretation. In interpreting this general test, therefore,
courts must still resort to common-law principles to resolve the
issue. Examining this general test, it appears to conform with a
court's need to interpret CERCLA's security interest exemption
with reference to common-law principles. The first prong of the
test, a requirement that the secured creditor exercise
decisionmaking control over the borrower's environmental compliance, resembles an agency-based theory. As with the agency theory,
the secured creditor's control must extend to that aspect of the
borrower's business in which the tort was committed - i.e., the
environmental aspects of the borrower's business. Therefore, when
interpreting the first prong of the final rule, courts should look to
agency theory to determine what type of control is required since
the test merely states "control." As with agency theory, this prong's
strictest requirement is not with its definition of control, but rather with the narrow scope of liability that the secured creditor is
exposed to - only that part of the debtor's business involved in
environmental compliance.
On the other hand, the second prong of the general test of
participation in management resembles the instrumentality theory.
This prong requires participation in management so that the secured creditor is involved in day-to-day decisionmaking over either
the borrower's environmental compliance, or all of the borrower's
operational aspects of the enterprise. Such a rule more closely
resembles the instrumentality theory's requirement of actual, total,
participatory control over all aspects of the debtor's business, and,
as such, courts should refer to this common-law theory when interpreting the second prong of the EPA's general test for participation in management.
Although the general test does negate some aspects of the
common-law theories of agency and instrumentality, such as control over financial aspects of the debtor's business having no impact on whether the secured creditor participated in the management of the facility, these theories are important for courts to use
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when interpreting the final rule's general test with its inevitable
gaps which will become evident on a case-by-case basis.
The second reason that the EPA final rule does not negate a
court's need to use the common-law principles of agency and
instrumentality when interpreting CERCLA's security interest exemption is found in a court's inevitable task of interpreting the
EPA's definition of "primarily to protect a security interest." Before
even reaching the general test and the controversial issue of
whether a secured creditor participated in the management of the
facility, under the final rule a court must first determine whether
the secured creditor held indicia of ownership primarily to protect
its security interest.2 1' This inquiry focuses on the distinction between an investment and a bona fide security interest to secure
repayment for a loan.2 12 In other words, a court must determine
whether the secured creditor held indicia of ownership as an investment. If so, the secured creditor's activities fall outside the
scope of the security interest exemption, and the question of
whether the secured creditor participated in the management of
the facility is never even addressed.
Since the proposed rule does not provide analysis as to when
a secured creditor's activities constitute an investment,213 a court
interpreting the rule must resort'to common-law principles of
lender liability. When a creditor/debtor relationship rises to the
level of an agency or instrumentality, the purpose is no longer to
secure the repayment of a loan; rather, a relationship different
from the typical creditor/debtor relationship has arisen. The principal and the alter ego of the debtor both have an investment in
the debtor's business. They are no longer merely typical secured
creditors - the debtor/agent acts for the principal's benefit, and
the debtor in the instrumentality scenario is actually the instrument of the creditor. Thus, under the EPA proposed rule, the
creditor/principal and alter ego of the debtor are excluded from
the scope of the security interest exemption before the EPA's
third definition -

"participation in management" -

is even con-

sidered.
The problem with the EPA proposed rule, however, is that
the creditor/debtor relationship rises to the level of an agency or

211 57 Fed. Reg. (1992)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. subpt. L)(issued April 24,
1992) (unpublished rule on file with the EPA, at 136).
212 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
213 57 Fed. Reg. (unpublished rule at 136).
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instrumentality based upon the level of control the creditor exercises over the debtor - in other words, the level of participation
in management. As the level of participation in management increases, so does the likelihood that the creditor has become a
principal or alter ego of the debtor. Therefore, some of the EPA's
allowable creditor activities would cause a secured creditor to be a
principal or alter ego of the debtor; thus, the secured creditor
would be investing in the debtor's business. The inconsistency
arises in the EPA's definition of participation in management,
where the final rule (unlike the proposed rule) specifically states
that the defined activities will not eliminate the secured creditor's
status as holding indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest. While the rule states that discussion of secured creditors holding indicia of ownership primarily for investment purposes is outside the scope of the final rule,2 14 it nevertheless attempts to include secured creditors holding indicia of ownership
primarily for investment purposes within the definition of participation in management. Thus, although the EPA explicitly states in
its definition of participation in management that certain investment activities do not negate the security interest exemption, its
general definition of primarily to protect a security interest would
negate such activities. Thus, there is an inconsistency within the
final rule itself. Additionally, when courts interpret the final rule,
they may, as they are required to do, resort to common-law principles to clarify the EPA's meaning of investment under primarily to
protect a security interest. If courts do as they should, the most
controversial aspects of the final rule included in the definition of
"participation in management" will be negated because some of
the allowable activities under this element are not permitted under the other elements of the rule, namely the definition of pri215
marily to protect a security interest.

214 Id.
215 A case-by-case analysis is the only way to truly determine which activities are permitted under these common-law theories. Nevertheless, the activities most likely to raise
the creditor/debtor relationship to that of an agency or instrumentality are regularly
monitoring and inspecting the debtor's business, facility, and operations, assuming financial control over the debtor through loan workout policies, and foreclosing for investment purposes. Although these activities are very broad, it is impossible to get more
detailed since the common law judges such activities on a case-by-case basis. This case-bycase analysis must be used because it is not each activity alone that creates the requisite
degree of control (also whether or not the debtor was acting within the scope of its
employment is a fact specific determination under the agency theory).
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Because the EPA ignored the well-established principles of
agency and instrumentality in promulgating its final rule, and
because courts should interpret CERCLA and the EPA final rule
in a manner owing deference to the common law,216 inconsistency will remain between these two branches of government in the
interpretation of CERCLA's security interest exemption.

C.

Congress

While many bills have been proposed in Congress to clarify
the meaning of CERCLA's security interest exemption, the only
recent action Congress has formally taken on the issue was the
reauthorization of CERCILA by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1990. The closest any bill has come to passing both the Senate
and the House was Title X of the banking and deposit insurance
reform bill (S 543), proposed by Senator Garn (R-Utah). 217 AJthough the lender liability clause passed the Senate, it did not
pass the House, and, thus, was eventually dropped from the final
218

bill.

Although no new bills have been proposed to clarify the secu-

rity interest exemption, it is projected that during 1992 there will
21 9

be a series of congressional hearings on CERCLA issues.
Whether or not such a bill, which has failed in previous attempts,
will pass during an election year of troubled economic times, however, is questionable.220 If Congress ever does pass legislation to

216 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
217 S. 651, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. S3279-83 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1991). See Howard and Gerard, supra note 141, at 1209-14. Another bill that Congress
proposed in 1991 and received a lot of support was H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REC. E987-88 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1991). See Howard and Gerard, supra note
141, at 1214-15.
218 A Number of Banking Bills Died for Year When Congress Adjourned, 57 Banking Report
(BNA) No. 23, at 930 (Dec. 1991).
219 Superfund, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA)(Env't Rep. Cas.) No. 39, at 2197 (Jan. 24, 1992).
The House Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight will continue hearings begun in 1991 on specific superfund sites in an attempt "to
ascertain why cleanups move quickly at some sites and slowly at others." Id. Additionally,
the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations plans to
"address EPA contracting and contractor charges under the superfund program," and
examine whether CERCLA successfully reduces threats to human health. Id. Likewise, the
Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Superfund, Oceans, and Water
Protection plans to hold hearings on CERCLA. Id.
220 "[S]everal congressional aides said the issue is too controversial for an election
year since environmental groups are opposed." Financial Institutions Legislation: Major
Banking Bill Unlikely in 1991, [Special Report] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No.
12, at S-4 (Jan. 17, 1992) ("'I think it's going to be a very political, partisan year, and I

1992]

NOTE-LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA

clarify the meaning of CERGIA's security interest exemption,
however, the common-law principles of agency and instrumentality
should be used as well-established doctrines to help clarify
CERGLA's statutory language.
IV.

CONCLUSION

CERGLA's security interest exemption has been subjected to
many different interpretations with many different results. Unfortunately, courts have ignored the role that the common law should
play in their interpretations of this statute, and consequently have
failed to use the common-law principles of agency and instrumentality as aids in interpreting the security interest exemption. This
Note urges the courts to do just that. Additionally, if courts effectively use common-law principles of lender liability, they will inevitably reach a different result than the EPA did with its final
rule. The application of the security interest exemption to lenders
will differ depending on who brings an action against lenders the EPA or a private party. The quest for consistency, however,
does not relieve courts from their obligation to interpret CERGLA
with reference to the common law; rather, Congress must step in
to resolve this inconsistency and clarify the meaning of this exemption. In passing legislation, however, Congress would achieve
greater success if the well-established principles of common-law
lender liability (the agency and instrumentality theories) were used
to interpret GEROLA's security interest exemption.
Elizabeth A. Wolford

think the economy is going to overshadow everything.'").

